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ΣERBONA

Belgrade School of Philosophy

Book of Abstracts

Theme of this year's Conference

Historical Narratives and Counternarratives

Editor:

Duško Prelević



Belgrade, 2026.

Applied Philosophy and Social Research Center
“Milenko Bodin”

Programme of the Conference

ΣERBONA

Belgrade School of Philosophy

Theme:

Historical Narratives and Counternarratives

Belgrade

8–9 September 2026

*The venue: Faculty of Philosophy, University of Belgrade,
Čika Ljubina 18–20, Room 108*

Tuesday, 8 September, Room 108

9:30 – Official Opening

Words in Memory of the founder of Serbona School Milenko
Bodin

9:45–10:30 – Keynote Speaker – Miroslava Trajkovski,
University of Belgrade: „Ideographic Curtain –
Reconstruction of one Deconstruction“

10:30–11:30 – Presentations, Part I (Moderator: Duško Prelević)

- Vinicio Busacchi, University of Cagliari: „Between Imagination and Reality: The Narrow Path of Historical Knowledge“
- Eleni Kaklamanou, University of Crete: „Beyond the Noble Lie: Autochthony and Political Narration in Plato’s Republic and Laws“
- Kenneth Howarth, Mercer County Community College: „Renarration without Reality Loss: An Adequacy Floor for Historical Counternarratives in the Age of Generative AI“
- Benjamin Kellogg, Georgia State University: „Communist Immoralism: A Heterodox Reading of Marx’s Metaethics“

11:30–12:00 – Discussion

12:00–12:30 – Coffee Break

12:30–13:30 – Presentations, Part II (Moderator: Vinicio Busacchi)

- Alessandra Grasso, University of Milan: „The Toaff Affair. On the Limits and Possibilities of Ginzburg’s Evidential Paradigm“

- Aleksandar Prnjat, Alfa BK University: „Vocabulary Change, Redescription and Historical Thinking in Richard Rorty“
- Giuseppe Lo Dico, Catholic University of Milan and Brescia: „Narratives and Popper’s Situational Analysis“
- Ivan Gospodinov, Catholic University of Eichstätt-Ingolstadt: „The Learned: Correct Representation or Expressive Progress?“

13:30–14:00 – Discussion

14:00–16:00 – Lunch

16:00–17:00 – Presentations, Part III (Moderator: Miroslava Trajkovski)

- Boshko Karadjov, Philosophical Society of Macedonia: „The Linguistic Turn in the Philosophy of History: From Hayden White’s Metahistory to Counterfactual ‘Maybe-history’“
- Aleksandar Prica, University of Belgrade: „What is Genealogy?“
- Alex Nemec, KU Leuven: „Narration Without Origin: A Blumenbergian Critique of Narrative Identity“

- Ilyasse Ouanani, Radboud University Nijmegen: „Myth and the Limits of Discursive Reason: Plato on the Narrative Conditions of Truth“

17:00–18:00 – Discussion (Moderator: Dušan Smiljanić)

18:00–19:00 – Presentations, Part IV (Moderator: Aleksandar Prica)

- Noah van der Togt, Radboud University Nijmegen: „Empathy and Intention“
- Monosree Chakraborty, Jadavpur University: „Structured Forgetting and the Broken Subject: Institutional Amnesia, Statelessness, and the Collapse of Narrative Identity“
- Joel Erhardt, University of Amsterdam: „Healing the Shattered Cogito: Ricoeur’s Narrative Identity and the Deconstructive Counter-narrative“
- Sukmin Yoon, Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg: „Narrating the Self: Ricoeur, Narrative Identity, and the Risk of Persuasive Totalization“

19:00–19:30 – Discussion

Wednesday, 9 September, Room 108

9:30–10:30 – Presentations, Part V (Moderator: Duško Prelević)

- Viorel Vizureanu, University of Bucharest: „Temporal Turn, (Then) Spatial Turn“
- Dorina Pătrunsu, University of Bucharest: „Is Moral Bioenhancement Project Compatible with Liberal Democracy? Some Critical Reflections“
- Laurențiu Gheorghe, University of Bucharest: „The Paradox of Transhumanism: The Search for Rest and Contemplation in an Ever-Evolving World“
- Vanja Bader, University of Belgrade: „Algorithmic Narratives and the (Re)Narration of History“
- Dušan Smiljanić, University of Belgrade: „Interest, Knowledge, and Truth in the Social Sciences and Humanities“

10:30–11:00 – Discussion

11:30 – Departure for Vinča

12:00–13:00 – Visit to the Archaeological Site

13:00–14:00 – Panel Discussion (Moderator: Dušan Smiljanić)

14:30–16:30 – Lunch

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

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CONFERENCE ABSTRACTS

Miroslava Trajkovski

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IDEOGRAPHIC CURTAIN – RECONSTRUCTION OF ONE DECONSTRUCTION

Abstract: *I analyze the phenomenon of the academic curtain that analytic philosophy has placed between itself on one side and a large part of the tradition and contemporary continental philosophy on the other side. I call this the ideographic curtain because it is both a conceptual and a notational barrier. The construction of this Wall began before World War I, was consolidated in the interwar period, and culminated after World War II during the Iron Curtain period. It began in Britain at the turn of the 20th century, with the urge to defeat or at least suppress German idealist philosophy, and as Peter Hylton (Russell, Idealism, and the Emergence of Analytic Philosophy, 1990) stresses, it is “a truism that one of the roots of twentieth-century analytic philosophy is the rejection of Idealism by Moore and Russell.” British professor W. J. Mander (British Idealism – A History, 2011) confirms the success of this undertaking; he says: “The chronicle of British philosophy as taught in our universities stops at Mill to start again with Russell and Moore, as though nothing at all happened in the intervening*

period.” The method was the creation of a special ideography at the beginning of the 20th century – an inevitable step in dealing with philosophical problems is the search for an appropriate notation and logical framework, and in the case of less technical discussions, a precise analysis is required. As Henri Poincaré (Science and Method, 1908) observes, “They have their own special language, in which words are used no longer, but only signs. This language can be understood only by the few initiated, so that the vulgar are inclined to bow before the decisive affirmations of the adepts.” Between the two wars, the idea of ideographic approaches was standardized through Rudolf Carnap’s Principle of tolerance (The Logical Syntax of Language, 1934), saying that “we have in every respect complete liberty with regard to the forms of language; that both the forms of construction for sentences and the rules of transformation (the latter are usually designated as ‘postulates’ and ‘rules of inference’) may be chosen quite arbitrarily.” This principle encouraged the participants in the discussion started in a certain framework to create additional notation for the needs of their argumentation. In parallel with this tolerant attitude, logical positivists posit the principle of verification, from which it follows that any thesis identified as metaphysical need not be refuted, but should not be talked about because it is meaningless. The Second World War brought about the fact that many logical positivists from the continental part of Europe whose academic careers were interrupted by the

*Second World War continued in the United States. Certainly, American pragmatism represented a fertile ground for continuing work on the ideas around which they gathered. Here we should refer to the generalization set by Richard Rorty who, in *Consequences of Pragmatism* (1982), claims that the history of analytic philosophy “has been marked by a gradual ‘pragmaticization’ of the original tenets of logical positivism.” After the Second World War in America, Joseph McCarthy played a leading role in suppressing the possibility of American universities becoming a platform for evaluating the political regimes of that era. Academics mostly chose neutral and technical questions. This, I would argue, led to the reverse process: American pragmatism was suppressed by logical positivism.*

Keywords: *ideography, notation, idealism, positivism, pragmatism, verification, demarcation*

Vinicio Busacchi

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BETWEEN IMAGINATION AND REALITY: THE NARROW PATH OF HISTORICAL KNOWLEDGE

Abstract: *As Gadamer suggests, human beings, as historical and cultural subjects, are shaped by linguisticity (Sprachlichkeit) and historicity (Geschichtlichkeit). It is from this constitutive condition that the centrality of narrative and self-narrative as a vital need arises. This fact has been recognised in various fields, beyond the realm of philosophy: in psychology, in sociology, in cultural anthropology, etc.; and it is significant that there is now a sharp increase in interdisciplinary exchanges and collaborations on this topic. In this regard, philosophy has played, and continues to play, a prominent role, as the example of Paul Ricoeur clearly demonstrates. He is credited, amongst other things, with defining the concept of narrative identity – a concept that lies at the heart of his philosophical anthropology but which has also been applied in the fields of narrative theory, hermeneutics, the philosophy of psychology and the philosophy of historical knowledge. In Ricoeur's later works, an approach to the theoretical and speculative problem of knowledge emerges that is concerned both with the objectivity*

of historical knowledge and with values, culture and the dominant ideology of a particular era, a given group, and so on. Ricoeur addresses this tension not through the practical and reflective apparatus of existential hermeneutics, but through the approach of a critical-hermeneutic realism that reflects the model of a mixed epistemology capable of curbing the potential hermeneutic-narrativist excesses of unilateralising models (such as Frank Ankersmit's and Hayden White's).

Keywords: Ricoeur, narrative identity, linguisticity, historicity, hermeneutics, realism, epistemology

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BEYOND THE NOBLE LIE: AUTOCHTHONY AND POLITICAL NARRATION IN PLATO'S REPUBLIC AND LAWS

Abstract: *Among the narratives through which political communities constitute themselves, myths of common origin occupy a privileged position. Such narratives do not merely recount the past; they actively shape collective identity, legitimate political authority, and define the conditions of civic belonging. Founding myths function not simply as representations of historical reality but as mechanisms through which communities interpret themselves and organize their political life. Plato's myth of autochthony, articulated in the Republic and reformulated in the Laws, provides one of the earliest philosophical examinations of this process of narrative construction. This paper argues that Plato's treatment of autochthony reveals a complex relationship between truth, persuasion, and the political production of identity. Rather than understanding the myth solely as an instance of the gennaion pseudos ("Noble Lie"), the paper examines it as a philosophical investigation into how narratives generate political realities and how communities*

negotiate the tension between historical truth, symbolic meaning, and civic necessity. Plato's political philosophy recognizes that political communities cannot be sustained through rational argument or institutional structures alone. They also require shared narratives that provide citizens with a sense of common origin, purpose, and belonging. Yet this reliance on narrative introduces a fundamental tension: the more effective political stories become in creating unity and stability, the greater the danger that they transform symbolic representation into ideological distortion. The myth of autochthony therefore occupies an ambiguous position. It is neither simply a falsehood nor a literal account of origins, but a political narrative whose function raises deeper questions about the conditions under which persuasion can remain connected to truth. The first part of this paper examines the Republic, where the myth of autochthony forms part of the educational foundation of the ideal city. Citizens are presented as children of the same earth, while the myth of the metals explains social differentiation and assigns distinct political roles. The narrative performs a dual function: it creates civic unity by establishing a shared origin while simultaneously legitimizing hierarchy within the city. Rather than interpreting the gennaion pseudos merely as a justification of deception, this paper argues that Plato exposes the constitutive role of narration in political life. Communities require narratives through which citizens can understand their place within a larger social and political order. The

analysis then turns to the Laws, where Plato develops a different relationship between myth, persuasion, and political formation. Although the dialogue abandons the explicit framework of the Noble Lie, it continues to rely on narratives embedded within law, religion, education, and civic practice. Through legal preludes and forms of rational persuasion, political identity is no longer established through a single founding fiction but maintained through continuous processes of interpretation and moral formation. The comparison between the two dialogues reveals a movement from the creation of political identity through foundational myth toward the preservation of political identity through institutionalized persuasion. This transformation, however, does not resolve the underlying problem. Plato distinguishes philosophical persuasion from sophistic manipulation by arguing that genuine persuasion is directed toward justice rather than mere agreement. Yet the distinction remains unstable, since citizens are still expected to accept narratives whose authority cannot always be established through philosophical demonstration alone. The movement from myth to persuasion therefore does not eliminate the problem of political narration; rather, it relocates it. Plato demonstrates that every political community must negotiate the fragile boundary between narratives that cultivate belonging and narratives that become instruments of domination. By examining autochthony as a form of political narration, this paper contributes to broader debates concerning truth,

representation, ideology, and collective identity. Plato's analysis remains relevant because modern political communities continue to construct themselves through narratives of origin, memory, and belonging, in which factual elements and symbolic interpretations are often inseparably intertwined. The central philosophical question is therefore not whether communities narrate themselves, but how such narratives should be evaluated: when they preserve a meaningful relationship to truth and when they become mechanisms of manipulation. Methodologically, the paper combines close textual analysis of the Republic and Laws with contemporary debates concerning narrative identity, political legitimacy, and ideology. It argues that the development of the myth of autochthony reveals not a simple transition from deception to persuasion, but Plato's increasingly sophisticated attempt to address an enduring political problem: how communities can cultivate shared identity without abandoning the demands of truth. Ultimately, Plato's treatment of autochthony demonstrates that political identity emerges through narratives that mediate between reality and representation, knowledge and persuasion. His political philosophy reveals a persistent tension: communities require stories through which they understand themselves, yet those same stories must remain open to critical examination if they are to remain compatible with truth, equality, and justice.

Keywords: *Plato, autochthony, myth, persuasion, legitimacy, identity, deception*

Kenneth Howarth

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[univerzitet – dopuniti]

**RENARRATION WITHOUT REALITY LOSS: AN
ADEQUACY FLOOR FOR HISTORICAL
COUNTERNARRATIVES IN THE AGE OF
GENERATIVE AI**

Abstract: *Historical narratives do more than arrange statements about the past. They configure and refigure temporal relations, distribute salience and responsibility, and help form the identities through which persons and communities understand what has happened to them and what may yet be done. For that reason, counternarratives can perform indispensable epistemic and political work. They may recover suppressed testimony, expose interested classifications, revise inherited causal explanations, and reopen possibilities closed by authoritative accounts. Yet opposition to a dominant narrative is not itself a warrant of truth. A counternarrative may correct one exclusion while introducing another, and an emancipatory purpose cannot convert fabrication, distortion, or person-erasure into historical adequacy. This paper develops a judgment-centered account of responsible renarration. It argues that historical representation is necessarily selective and situated but*

remains answerable to a reality that exceeds any narration of it. This position rejects both a correspondence ideal that treats narration as a transparent copy of the past and a pluralism in which competing narratives possess no shared conditions of assessment. Following Ricoeur's critical-hermeneutic account of configuration, refiguration, memory, and testimony, while retaining the distinction between what occurred and how it is represented, the paper treats a historical narrative as a bounded capture: potentially true and warranted within a stated frame, yet neither exhaustive nor immune to revision (Ricoeur 1984-1988, 2004). Narrative mediation therefore qualifies historical truth without dissolving it. The work's distinctive contribution is a renarrative adequacy floor: minimum conditions under which a narrative or counternarrative can guide judgment without foreclosing it. Five conditions are proposed. First, evidential traceability and claim-status clarity require readers to be able to distinguish documented occurrence, testimony, interpretation, causal inference, conjecture, and advocacy. Second, situated disclosure makes relevant standpoints, interests, categories, and selection practices visible without assuming that disclosure alone neutralizes them. Third, defeater openness requires a narration to remain corrigible by contrary evidence, excluded testimony, and better explanation. Fourth, standing and non-reduction ask who may speak for whom, whose testimony can challenge the account, and whether persons or populations have been confined

within identities assigned by the narrator. Fifth, answerability and repair require responsibility for representation, correction, consequential use, and institutional uptake to remain locatable. These conditions respond to the production of historical silences and epistemic exclusion without presuming that counternarrative status supplies automatic authority (Trouillot 1995; Fricker 2007; Medina 2013). They do not produce a single mandatory history. They distinguish responsible plurality from the mere multiplication of persuasive accounts. Generative artificial intelligence makes this distinction urgent. Large language and image models are becoming interfaces through which users encounter the past, but they do not simply retrieve settled historical content. They synthesize narratively ordered responses from uneven corpora under prompt-dependent and often opaque conditions. Recent research has documented synthetic historical gazes, language-dependent shifts in responsibility and emotional framing, and variable susceptibility to atrocity denialism (Hoskins 2024; Stjernholm, Eriksson, and Mohammadi Noren 2025; Papaioannou 2026; Ulloa et al. 2026). The resulting problem exceeds familiar “hallucination.” Even a response containing individually accurate statements can hide its source pathways, compress live historiographical disputes, omit a party’s standing to contest, or simulate a consensus that no answerable community of inquiry has reached. The paper names this an answerability gap in synthetic renarration. Generative

systems sharply reduce the cost and time of producing plausible historical accounts while obscuring who selected the evidence, authorized the framing, and bears obligations of correction. Provenance labels and factual verification remain necessary, but they are insufficient when the central issue is the configuration of significance, responsibility, and identity. Nor is the answer to ban AI from historical inquiry. Generative systems may help locate neglected materials, compare formulations, surface possible omissions, or make contested archives more accessible. Their use becomes defensible, however, only when relevant persons and institutions retain reason-responsive understanding of the account, authority commensurate with responsibility, practical powers of intervention and revision, and visible routes of contestation and repair. This argument is tested against recent work on AI-mediated collective memory and multilingual historical narration. These cases show why model evaluation must ask more than whether an output contains false propositions. The relevant questions include which narrative possibilities become available, which disappear, whose terms organize the account, and whether a user can recover the evidence and disagreement that fluent synthesis conceals. A model may refuse explicit denialism and still weaken historical judgment by producing seamless closure where responsible inquiry requires unresolvedness. Responsible counternarration is therefore best understood as correction that remains open to correction. Its emancipatory

force lies neither in replacing one final narrative with another nor in treating all accounts as equally valid, but in enlarging a judgment ecology while preserving reality-contact, standing, contestability, and repair. The proposed adequacy floor offers a way to assess historical persuasion without imagining persuasion can be removed from discourse, and to admit narrative plurality without accepting reality loss. In the age of generative AI, the question is not only whether a historical account convinces or even whether its sentences are accurate. It is whether the sociotechnical process that produces and circulates the account remains answerable to evidence, persons, reasons, and revision.

Keywords: *counternarrative, renarration, renarrative adequacy, answerability, testimony, judgment, generative AI*

Benjamin Kellogg

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COMMUNIST IMMORALISM: A HETERODOX READING OF MARX'S METAETHICS

Abstract: *This essay concerns the relation between knowledge and ideology, and between economic and moral senses of “value”. Engaging with the marginalized, heterodox tradition of antimoralist metaethics in the history of Marxism, as exemplified by Evgeny Pashukanis, I address the question: why would Marx say, as he does in the Communist Manifesto, that communism “abolishes [...] all morality” (MECW 6:504)? The answer depends on what sociological explanation for the existence of moral ideology as such we can find in Marx’s work. And, I argue, no extant interpretation has sufficiently reconstructed such an explanation. Moral readings of Marx are having a moment. Multiple recent, well-received monographs agree that Marx is best read as, among other things, a moral philosopher (Wills 2024, Foster 2025, Lazarus 2025). Opponents of this view argue that Marx criticized morality, but only because some moral norms serve the ruling class’s interests (Edwards and Leiter 2024; Leiter 2022; Wood 2004, 2012). Neither camp is able to conceive Marx as what, I argue, he is: a critic and*

opponent of all morality, of morality as such. Yet the immoralist Marx, who emerges when we entertain the possibility that he meant what he said when he repeatedly condemned all moral judgement as pernicious ideology, is, like Nietzsche, a more interesting and subversive metaethical thinker than has so far been appreciated. I am not the first to call Marx an “immoralist” (Wood 2004, 152). When it comes to why Marx opposed all moral judgement, however, Wood defers to the same reading as so many others who want to resist a moralist interpretation of Marx: the popular reduction of Marx’s attitude towards morality to the observation that any particular popular moral intuition is likely to serve ruling class interests (2012, 508). This reading, which I call the “class-instrumentalist” reading, cannot explain why Marx would call for the abolition of all morality, or morality as such, rather than just this or that particular class’s moral views. By a critique of morality as such, I mean a critique of morality’s form — whatever is shared by all moral norms or judgements that make them count as moral ones, the stuff of metaethics. The class-instrumentalist account only amounts to a critique of morality’s content, not its form. Marx’s critique of political economy begins with the question that political economists never ask, “the question of why this content takes that form”, why the products of human labor are “represented in value” in the first place (Marx 2024, 56-7). A critique of morality as such, similarly, should begin with a question the class-instrumentalists never ask:

Why do norms and values, inevitably employed by human beings in their social intercourse as they produce and reproduce their existence, take the form of distinctly moral norms and values? If class-instrumentalism exhausted Marx's resources for explaining a particular ideology's genesis, then there would be no answer for the two questions posed in the previous section concerning morality's form. Fortunately, for Marx, some ideological appearances can be partly explained by economic relations distinct from, and defined in abstraction from, class: namely, the value-form of commodities, which at least explains commodity fetishism. For Pashukanis, Marx's analysis of the value-form of commodities explains, "provides the key to an understanding of", not the "content of [...] moral norms, but [...] the form itself" (Pashukanis 151). His conclusion is that morality is nothing more than a reflection of commodity exchange. However, I argue, it is not quite the case that morality is, as Pashukanis says, a "distorted reflection" of the mediation of social relations by value (157). Nor is it, strictly speaking, "a necessary condition for exchange according to the law of value" (151). Pashukanis's analysis only shows that the moral point of view is logically presupposed by (belief in) value's fetishistic appearances; it does not follow that morality is a fetishistic inversion of value, or that the commodity-producing society at all requires moral ideology. The social basis of moral ideology, whatever it is, is reducible to neither class nor value. Still, my alternative account in the

following section will have much in common with Pashukanis's. While moral ideology cannot be derived, reduced to, or explained by the commodity fetish that results from the horizontal relations between producers in the commodity-producing society, its form will be analogous to that fetishism in many ways, and Marx's analysis of the value-form will indeed be crucial to understanding morality's social basis. In particular, I will argue that we find in Marx's scattered notes and digressions the basis for an analysis of the form the human being takes on when appearing as a morally responsible "subject" as homologous to the "equivalent form" of value (and its inverted reflection). However, the homologue to the equivalent form that will provide the social basis for morality's form will not be the monetary one that arises in horizontal relations among commodity-producers in abstraction from class, but instead will be a form taken on by human beings themselves in relations of indebtedness that only arise in virtue of vertical relations of specifically capitalist class domination, even while this indebtedness is not reducible to class-relations in abstraction from value. The social basis of moral ideology is parallel to that of the "capital fetish" that arises in finance, as the social basis for morality's form to be found in the debt that is capital itself, the totality resulting from the mutual mediation of class and value.

Keywords: *Marx, Pashukanis, immoralism, morality, ideology, value, fetishism*

Alessandra Grasso

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**THE TOAFF AFFAIR. ON THE LIMITS AND
POSSIBILITIES OF GINZBURG'S EVIDENTIAL
PARADIGM**

Abstract: *History has traditionally been understood in two complementary senses: as res gestae, the mere sum of events that occurred, and historia rerum gestarum, their reconstruction through historical inquiry and narrative. Although conceptually distinct, these two dimensions are inseparable in research practice: every historical narration is the outcome of procedures of selection, interpretation, and organization of different sources. The talk examines the relationship between fact-finding and narrative construction by investigating the boundary between legitimate interpretative hypotheses and the distortion of documentary data. The discussion centers on the controversial case of Pasque di Sangue by the historian Ariel Toaff (2007). The book argues that extremist fringes of the Ashkenazi communities may have practiced ritual murder, thereby suggesting a partial historical basis for the centuries-old Christian blood libel. Rather than assessing the historical plausibility of Toaff's thesis or engaging with the political and*

ethical controversies it generated, the talk focuses exclusively on its epistemological and methodological implications. The Toaff affair provides an opportunity to examine fundamental questions concerning the scientific status of historical inquiry: how sources are selected and interpreted, how hypotheses are justified, and how documentary evidence is translated into coherent historical narratives. To address this topic, the talk starts from the traditional division of historical research into four phases: heuristics, source criticism, interpretation, and narrative (Chabod 1989). The question is in which of these phases does the justificatory moment occur. Heuristics is not simply the sourcing of sources, but the formulation of questions orienting the historian's gaze. Toaff has been accused of starting from an a priori hypothesis and only considering the sources confirming it. It would be naïve not to accept that every historical investigation begins with a preliminary hypothesis: all historians approach documents and materials always based on their perspective. The historiographical problem lies not so much in having a starting hypothesis, but in how it is subjected to scrutiny. Particular attention is devoted to Toaff's use of the 1475 Trento trial records and his appeal to the historian Carlo Ginzburg's "evidential paradigm" (1989). According to this approach, even confessions extracted under torture may preserve traces of the persecuted culture that the persecutors had been unable to erase. The application of this paradigm raises questions about whether it works in the so-called

“context of discovery” — the initial intuition of grasping some truth within the folds of the minutes — or in the “context of justification” — the assessment of the validity of the narrative in light of the evidence. Regarding the phases of source criticism and document interpretation, Ginzburg (2007) harshly criticizes Toaff’s application of the evidential paradigm, describing it as “abusive.” For Ginzburg, Toaff fails to examine discrepancies between the statements of the persecuted and the expectations of their persecutors. Instead, he privileges only those documentary elements that confirm what the inquisitors sought to find, that is, that ritual murder was a common practice among certain Jewish communities. More precisely, Toaff questionably infers from certain marginal details of the documents the validity of the persecutors’ accusation of ritual murder itself. In short, for Ginzburg, Toaff reverses the evidential paradigm: he uses the clues not as justificatory elements but as mere arguments supporting his a priori assumed hypothesis. It is worth noting that Ginzburg’s criticism extends well beyond the specific case of Toaff. Rather, it raises a broader epistemological question about the validity of historical interpretation itself: when multiple scholars assess the same body of evidence yet produce incompatible historical narratives, on what grounds can one interpretation be considered the most reliable and scientifically valid? This brings us back to the question of whether the evidential paradigm is a heuristic tool for formulating hypotheses and directing the historian’s gaze to

*anomalies, a model for justifying those hypotheses themselves, or both. At stake here is the relationship between clues and evidence. If the evidential paradigm appears decisive for discovering clues, it must be determined whether it can serve to interpret these clues as evidence supporting the hypotheses. If it could not work in this justificatory manner, but it was used in this way, the evidential paradigm could dangerously lead to confirmation of the historian's expectations: every mere clue or suggestion could be considered confirmatory evidence. The epistemological status of the evidential paradigm also affects the final stage in historical inquiry: the construction of a coherent historical narrative from heterogeneous documentary sources. In this sense, narrative coherence becomes the testing ground for the entire interpretative architecture. In fact, the scientific validity of a historical narrative depends not only on the availability of sources but also on the procedures through which they are interrogated, interpreted, and integrated into a coherent reconstruction. In conclusion, the Toaff affair shows how the distance between history as *res gestae* and history as *historia rerum gestarum* is not simply a gap to be bridged: rather, it represents the fundamental epistemological problem within which all historical knowledge of the past inevitably takes shape.*

Keywords: *Ginzburg, Toaff, clues, evidence, justification, historiography, method*

Aleksandar Prnjat

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VOCABULARY CHANGE, REDESCRIPTION AND HISTORICAL THINKING IN RICHARD RORTY

Abstract: *The author discusses the relationship between the changing vocabulary of redescription and historical thinking in the philosophy of Richard Rorty. It starts from Rorty's thesis that the problems and themes through which we approach the world and the philosophical tradition depend on the vocabulary we use to describe them. But a change in vocabulary is not just a change in terminology, but a change in the way historical material is organized and made relevant. The main thesis of the paper is that Rorty's understanding of vocabulary has direct consequences for the understanding of historical interpretation. History does not appear as a neutrally arranged set of facts from which its meaning can simply be read; it is described and reorganized through certain vocabularies, which determine which events, authors, texts, problems and relationships we single out as relevant. In this sense, redescription does not mean arbitrarily remaking the past, but rather the possibility of articulating the same historical material through different relations of relevance and significance. Special attention will be paid to Rorty's*

attitude towards textualism and his understanding of the history of philosophy, especially where the pragmatist perspective is connected with the possibility of new descriptions of the philosophical past. It will be shown that redescription in Rorty is both a historical and a pragmatic operation: changing the way we describe the past can change the way we understand our own present, and thus open up new possibilities for practice. The significance of Rorty's notion of redescription is not only that it allows for a variety of different descriptions of the past, but that the new description proposes what we stand for as historically relevant. The contingency of vocabulary thus acquires a double dimension: it explains why we can describe history differently, but also why such redescriptions can have practical consequences.

Keywords: *vocabulary, redescription, history, textualism, Richard Rorty*

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NARRATIVES AND POPPER'S SITUATIONAL ANALYSIS

Abstract: *Narrative is a fundamental, if not the primary, mode of understanding in history and, perhaps, all the social sciences (Kosso, 2009, pp. 21-22). More precisely, historical and social phenomena appear to be best understood through narrative, both as a means of organizing evidence and presenting it in a coherent form. In this sense, a narrative can be understood as a scientific hypothesis whose validity and reliability require critical assessment. This raises familiar epistemological questions: How can we establish that one narrative of a given event is more valid and reliable than another one? What counts as the facts or the evidence capable of supporting or refuting a narrative? In what sense can a narrative be said to be true or false? These questions concern the problem of justification, arguably the central issue of all scientific inquiry and certainly the cornerstone of the philosophy of science. The philosopher Karl R. Popper dealt with the problem of justification throughout his career, concentrating primarily on the natural sciences, where he became well known for his doctrine of falsificationism as an*

alternative to inductivism. His reflections on the social sciences, however, have received comparatively less attention. These reflections are developed in what Popper called "situational analysis." He first outlines this approach in The Poverty of Historicism (1957, p. 141; see also Popper, 1972, p. 179): I refer to the possibility of adopting, in the social sciences, what may be called the method of logical or rational construction, or perhaps the "zero method." By this I mean the method of constructing a model on the assumption of complete rationality (and perhaps also on the assumption of the possession of complete information) on the part of all the individuals concerned, and of estimating the deviation of the actual behavior using the latter as a kind of zero coordinate. According to Popper, the historian's task is to construct a narrative of a given event or phenomenon by explaining how the different actors involved (not only individuals but also groups and institutions) acted and how they would have acted under the assumption of rationality. In constructing such a narrative, the historian must assume that the actors behaved as rational agents: for example, that they made use of all available information to reach their goals (Popper, 1957, p. 140). Importantly, this principle of rationality is not universal or ahistorical but depends upon the cultural and historical context in which the narrative's actors are situated. It would therefore be misleading to interpret the conduct of a courtier of the Sun King through the same conceptual categories of a contemporary historian. What counts as rational for a person

occupying a particular social position in a given historical context may appear irrational and even incomprehensible from the perspective of another time and a different social status. Although Popper refined and expanded situational analysis throughout his work, the model consistently retains at least three defining features: no appeal to general laws, since situational analysis does not explain historical events by subsuming them under universal laws but constructs an idealized model of the situation based on the principle of rationality; no appeal to subjectivity or psychology, since explanations need not rely on the actors' mental states or psychological processes but only on the "(...) elements of the objective social situation" (Popper, 1994, p. 167); and no distinctive logic or justification for the social sciences, since historical narratives, like scientific theories, are hypotheticalal constructions that must be tested through the method of falsification against available evidence. The talk examines situational analysis as a model for understanding and justifying narratives in the social sciences. On the one hand, it argues that Popper's proposal remains persuasive today in treating narratives as hypotheses rather than as applications of general laws and, at least partially, in emphasizing the rationality of agents within specific situations. In this general sense, Popper is right to characterize the historian's work as following a "(...) schema of problem-solving by the method of imaginative conjectures and criticism" (Popper, 1972, p. 164). On the other hand, the talk argues that Popper's

attempt to exclude subjectivity and what he calls “psychologism” is controversial. His skepticism toward subjective and psychological dimensions in historical explanation appears to reflect an ideal of objectivity inherited from Logical Positivism. More precisely, this ideal presupposes a notion of evidence as something intersubjectively assessable, capable of providing a neutral basis for evaluating competing theories. Consequently, Popper maintains that the method of justification (namely, the hypothetico-deductive method of falsification) is common to all sciences because it relies on the conception of evidence grounded in intersubjective agreement. The talk concludes by arguing that these limitations can be overcome by revising Popper’s situational analysis in accordance with the coherentist model of understanding and justification proposed by Kosso for historical narratives (Kosso, 1993, p. 13). Such a revision makes it possible to accommodate both subjectivity and psychological explanation without abandoning the strengths of Popper’s approach. More generally, it provides the social sciences with a model of narrative explanation that neither appeals to general laws nor assumes that historical evidence must be understood in the same way as evidence in the natural sciences.

Keywords: Popper, rationality, situation, narrative, falsification, justification, psychologism, coherentism

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Education Without Backpacks

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THE LEARNED: CORRECT REPRESENTATION OR EXPRESSIVE PROGRESS?

Abstract: *This paper examines the notion of the learned in relation to recognition, representation and self-conceptualization. It begins from the tension that we often treat learning as the acquisition of correct representations and their successful practical application in judging and acting, while at the same time recognizing that what one learns becomes part of a broader narrative of identity, public discursive responsibility and belonging. To learn something is not only to possess a representation of it, but to become capable of placing oneself within a space of reasons: to consider what one is committed to by claiming or doing something, what follows from it and what could count against it. This account is explicitly grounded in Robert Brandom's inferentialism, especially his claim that conceptual content is to be understood through the role an expression plays in reasoning rather than through its representational relation to objects. This argument proceeds from an inferentialist philosophy of education, according to which learning consists in entering a practice of giving and asking for reasons, for it*

is in this practice that the explication of descriptive, normative and modal (hypothetical) conceptual content contributes to the acquisition of robust inferential relations. A representation may be correct and yet remain educationally inert if the learner cannot use it in reasoning. A historical fact, for example, is not learned merely as a semantically self-sufficient linguistic representation of past states of affairs. It is learned when the student can situate it within a network of interrelated descriptive, normative and modal considerations, including counterfactual relations and questions of semantic significance. Such learning extends beyond the reproduction of content and enters into meaning-making attempts related to belonging and identity. To learn a historical concept is also to acquire a possible way of locating oneself in relation to a cultural and historical world. The first part of the paper criticizes what may be called educational representationalism: the assumption that representations are the main candidate for learning content and that learning intentions are in essence representative ones. This assumption is not completely false, since education clearly requires representations in the form of texts, images, diagrams, spreadsheets, formulae, maps, models and other symbolic forms. The problem arises when these representations are treated as if they were reality itself or as if their correct use were sufficient for taking up semantic responsibility. Educational representationalism is therefore not wrong because it values correctness, but because it mistakes

correctness for the whole of learning. The second part connects this critique to the notion of self-conceptualization. Since personal identity is biographically formed, learning also affects how the learner understands themselves as a participant in a cultural, historical and normative world. To learn the history of a concept is to acquire a new way of describing reality and, at the same time, a new way of describing one's own relation to reality. A concept can therefore be integrated into a responsible self-relation, shaping not only what the learner claims, but how the learner can understand what they have been, what they are becoming and what they may responsibly claim about themselves. The third part introduces the notion of irresponsible learning, which is a distorted form of conceptual articulation in which the learner takes up representations or available formulations, including what Sellars calls the Given, without assuming responsibility for their inferential and semantic consequences and incompatibilities. Such learning may appear successful from the outside, because the learner can produce correct answers, without being semantically committed to them. Yet it remains irresponsible when the learner cannot say what follows from what has been learned, what would count against it or how it should be situated in relation to the claims of others. Irresponsible learning can nevertheless remain hidden behind a facade of good performative results. Recognition is central to diagnosing this problem, because irresponsible learning is identifiable only

within relations of reciprocal recognition and trust, where the learner's relation to what is learned cannot be reduced to observable performance. A teacher may see that a learner gives a correct answer, but this does not yet show whether the learner can take responsibility for that answer. The learner must be recognized as a participant in a shared practice of meaning-making and, at the same time, must be willing to recognize the claims of others as possible reasons, challenges or corrections. Learning therefore depends on a recognitive relation in which one can be trusted, questioned, corrected and allowed to make explicit what one means. Taking responsibility for the learned, that is, being able to think, talk and be about it, implies keeping a deontic or norm-binding score on one's own and others' discursive commitments. To develop robust inferential networks on these terms means to integrate one's actual, previous and possible conceptions, self-conceptions and reconceptions (i.e., realized mistakes) into a coherent argument. In this case, an error is to be understood as core learning content, for it is semantically significant for the learner to be able to recognize what was previously misunderstood and incorporate that recognition into a more responsible self-understanding. The paper concludes by proposing the concept of expressive progress as an alternative to the representational model of learning. In this sense, expressive progress is the educational reconstruction of Brandom's expressivism, for it names the learner's increasing capacity to make explicit what was

previously implicit in their conceptual practice. Expressive progress names the learner's growing capacity to make explicit the commitments implicit in what they say, to recognize the claims of others as reasons and to participate responsibly in shared practices of meaning-making, characterized by the integration of previous misuse of concepts in reasoning. The learned, in this sense, is not simply what has been correctly represented or applied in practice. It is what has been taken up into a responsible form of self-conceptualization, where knowledge and skills become part of how one thinks, speaks, behaves and belongs.

Keywords: *Brandom, inferentialism, learning, representation, recognition, responsibility, self-conceptualization*

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**THE LINGUISTIC TURN IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF
HISTORY: FROM HAYDEN WHITE'S
METAHISTORY TO COUNTERFACTUAL "MAYBE-
HISTORY"**

Abstract: *This conference paper examines the relationship between narrativity, metahistory, and the epistemology of history, with particular emphasis on the theoretical contribution of Hayden White. It argues that historical knowledge is not merely a collection of objective facts but is actively constituted through narrative structures that provide coherence, meaning, and interpretive frameworks for the past. By analyzing historical texts as both literary and cognitive constructions, the paper explores the ways in which narrative shapes our understanding of historical reality. Particular attention is devoted to counterfactual approaches to history, demonstrating how hypothetical scenarios can function as valuable epistemological tools for reflecting upon historical contingency, causality, and interpretation. Ultimately, the paper argues that narrative discourse plays a fundamental role in the construction of historical consciousness and in determining the epistemic status of historical knowledge.*

Keywords: *epistemology of history, metahistory, narrativity, Hayden White, historical discourse, counterfactual history, maybe-history*

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WHAT IS GENEALOGY?

Abstract: *Nietzsche criticised his predecessors for their lack of historical sense, and it is as a response to this lack that he offers his genealogy. The aim of this paper is therefore to determine precisely what genealogy is. In the first part I defend the thesis that although Nietzsche thematises genealogy only in the late phase of his philosophy, its germs can already be found in one of his early essays, On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life. In the second part I set out the specific features of Nietzsche's use of the concept of genealogy: he rejects its traditional sense, according to which the value of a thing is determined by the beginning of its history in the form of its origin, while at the same time rejecting the teleological conception of history, according to which the value of a thing is determined by the end of its history in the form of its purpose. In the third and concluding part I defend the thesis that, in place of origin or purpose, Nietzsche takes as the object of genealogy the process of emergence itself, which he understands as the conflict and succession of competing interpretations of various practices, behind which lies the will to power. This implies that*

Nietzsche does not regard genealogy — and consequently history — as an objective representation of past events, which is precisely the scientific approach to history he criticised in On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life; instead, he approaches it hermeneutically, treating it as a currently superior narrative that has succeeded in overpowering alternative narratives, a success decided by its persuasiveness, that is, by its effect on the reader. In order to bring out this hermeneutic understanding of Nietzsche's genealogy more clearly, I compare it with Quentin Skinner's revisionist conception of history, which rests on John Austin's speech act theory and his distinction between locutionary and illocutionary acts.

Keywords: *philosophy of history, Friedrich Nietzsche, genealogy, revisionist history*

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NARRATION WITHOUT ORIGIN: A BLUMENBERGIAN CRITIQUE OF NARRATIVE IDENTITY

Abstract: *Narrative identity theories hold that narrativity and narration are the fundamental structure in which personal identity emerges. Where the self emerges narratively, self-consciousness is always already structured for the purposes of narration. The narrative thesis derives its force from a genuine observation: the phenomenon of selfhood appears to be visible exclusively within narrative structures. From the pervasiveness of narrative for the purposes of self-understanding, the narrative theory infers that narrativity of consciousness is what generates selfhood. I argue that this thesis obscures rather than explains the phenomenon in question. This is because this thesis cannot explain why personal identity takes the form of narrative in the first place. That it is pervasive does not explain why it is so. Drawing on the philosophy of Hans Blumenberg, I argue that narrativity of consciousness should be understood not as the source of identity, but instead that identity as narrative is a solution to a problem. That identity emerges in the form of a narrative suggests that knowledge of the essence of things*

(even of the self) is not available, and this absence must be dealt with. Moreover, I claim that the pervasiveness of identity as narrative does not suggest its foundational status but rather is an effective and durable way of dealing with this absence. A critique of narrativity, however, does not suggest an alternative foundation for identity. Instead, it serves as a critique of the requirement that identity's pervasive structure must also be its foundation. Pervasiveness does not mean foundationality. Instead, it points to its effectiveness. The lever for this critique is Blumenberg's argument, developed against Ernst Cassirer and traditional theorists of myth, that originality and beginnings are the effect of durability rather than its cause. Cassirer held that myth derives its mythical quality from its proximity to an originary moment of human consciousness. I argue that Cassirer's position coincides with the argument of narrative identity theories. Abstracting from the specific case of myth, this argument holds that how our self-consciousness came to be, and what movement this coming to be exhibits, explains what endures. Blumenberg reverses this. What has proven durable through reception and survival of stories (myths) produces the effect of originariness. Beginnings are not discovered but assigned, read backward from what has survived. Applied to narrative identity, this reversal is decisive. The apparent originariness of narration is itself an effect of narration's success as a practice, not evidence that narration is where identity-formation begins. What requires explanation is therefore not

narration's content or structure, but why identity-formation takes the form of narrative in the first place. What is the source of the possibility to narrate? The answer, I argue, is disclosed in reflection on the possibility of description. There is a structural deficiency of transparency that is proper to description and that description, in turn, makes visible. To describe is to make something visible for another, in and over time. But what one "sees," in the first place, is not what one chooses to see. One is delivered over to what is always already there, in the mode of givenness proper to its appearing. Self-consciousness does not coincide with its own beginning. Nor, in the second place, does description deliver what is seen in such a way that another could occupy the position from which I see it. Our spatio-temporal positions never fully coincide. The former names a belatedness internal to description: what is described is never originary to the description itself. The latter names a non-coincidence: no description can fully satisfy the demand that it be appropriate to what it describes, since the position of the one who describes is never fully transferable to another. Description, then, is the site at which this "deficiency" becomes visible. It discloses the problem without solving it. Narration, I argue, is a response to what description reveals; it is a solution offered to the problem of belatedness and non-coincidence, not a further instance of the same difficulty. What I am calling here "deficiency" does not name a gap between description and some hidden essence that exceeds it. Its value is instead self-

reflexive: it shows that the demand for an exhaustive self-description is itself malformed. I follow Blumenberg in holding that the “inner” has no priority over the “outer,” and that self-description does not precede self-presentation. Any claim to an identity is defended and won before others, rather than discovered and known before and for oneself. Narration, on this account, is not the foundational structure of self-understanding but one of the solutions posed by the deficiency that description discloses. It is a way to deal with a situation in which perfect transparency is constitutively unavailable. Consequently, I argue that narrative is a form of rhetorical self-assertion against conditions where demonstrative grounds are unavailable, but dealing with one’s situation is nonetheless required. This is what Blumenberg calls the principle of insufficient reason, which is the condition of possibility of rhetoric. Narration is, even where it is self-narration, a rhetorical labour, the purpose of which is to deal with one’s situation, though it may never finally solve it. There is no sufficient reason to claim one has arrived at the truth of oneself, because no criterion for final self-knowledge is available. But the effectiveness of identity as narrative and the durability of what proves convincing are not arbitrary. They are outcomes of an ongoing selective process of reception against which new narratives prove adequate or inadequate, not true or false. This means that re-narration, accordingly, is not progress toward a ‘truer’ self but a continuation of the same rhetorical labour, whether

undertaken as revision or imposed as a challenge from another position. The question of which narrative is the true account of a self thus belongs to the very framework it claims to adjudicate. The more productive question is which self-assertions prove themselves capable of being lived with, defended, and retold.

Keywords: *Blumenberg, narration, identity, myth, description, rhetoric, originariness*

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**MYTH AND THE LIMITS OF DISCURSIVE REASON:
PLATO ON THE NARRATIVE CONDITIONS OF
TRUTH**

Abstract: *How does philosophy communicate truths that cannot be secured by argument alone? Philosophical discourse has traditionally identified itself with rational demonstration, conceptual clarification, and argumentative validity. To know is to possess reasons, and philosophy distinguishes itself from poetry, rhetoric, and myth precisely by its commitment to discursive demonstration under logos. Yet this distinction raises a persistent problem. Even when an argument is logically valid, internally coherent, and epistemically well-founded, it may nevertheless fail to convince or even become intelligible to its audience. The question is therefore not simply how truth is established, but how it becomes recognisable and how that recognition can be sustained beyond the circumstances of its original articulation. This paper argues that Plato identifies this problem with remarkable clarity and that his appeal to myth constitutes a philosophical response to it rather than a departure from philosophy proper. The relation between truth*

and persuasion is often conceived as one of opposition. Truth belongs to reason and dialectic, persuasion to rhetoric; truth is bound up with justification, persuasion with belief. Such distinctions continue to structure contemporary discussions concerning matters from political communication to the authority of knowledge. Yet, they presuppose that truth can be communicated independently of the forms through which it is received. Plato's dialogues repeatedly call this assumption into question. Although Plato consistently distinguishes dialectic from (sophistic) rhetoric, the dialogues simultaneously demonstrate that argumentative validity alone is insufficient to produce philosophical recognition. The problem is not merely that some interlocutors are irrational or unwilling to follow the argument. Rather, the dialogues suggest that the capacity to recognise truth presupposes a prior formation of the soul that argument alone cannot produce. This paper therefore asks whether Plato's recurring use of myth should be understood not as an ornamental or pedagogical supplement to dialectic, but as an indispensable moment within philosophical communication itself. I argue that Plato repeatedly turns to myth precisely where discursive reasoning reaches its limits; not because reason fails, but because the recognition of truth requires forms of mediation that cannot be exhausted by demonstrative argument. Myth is not introduced where philosophy ends; it appears where philosophy confronts the conditions of its own possibility. The argument looks at parts of the Republic, the Phaedrus, and

the Symposium. These dialogues have often been treated separately, or their myths interpreted according to distinct doctrinal functions: the Myth of Er as eschatology, the myth of the winged soul as psychology, Diotima's speech as an account of eros. While these readings capture important aspects of the texts, they risk obscuring a common philosophical function. In each dialogue, myth appears at precisely those moments when dialectic has brought the interlocutor to the threshold of philosophical insight but cannot itself complete the transformation that philosophy seeks to accomplish. The Republic provides perhaps the clearest illustration of this pattern. Socrates' account of justice culminates not in a deductive conclusion but in the Myth of Er. The myth does not establish the truth of the argument already presented nor does it merely motivate ethical conduct through the promise of reward and punishment. Instead, it situates philosophical claims within a narrative horizon in which they become existentially meaningful. Likewise, the allegory of the cave, although frequently treated as an epistemological model, is itself a narrative of conversion. It describes not simply the acquisition of knowledge but the painful reorientation through which an entirely different world becomes visible. Knowledge is therefore inseparable from a transformation of the subject who comes to know. A similar structure emerges in the Phaedrus. Plato's account of rhetoric famously insists that genuine persuasion requires knowledge of the soul. Yet the

dialogue's own treatment of the soul is entrusted not to dialectical demonstration but to the myth of the charioteer. The myth does not replace philosophical reasoning, nor does it function merely as an illustrative image. Rather, it provides a way of thinking about psychic life that cannot be captured through conceptual analysis alone. It discloses a mode of intelligibility in which philosophical insight depends upon imaginative participation as much as argumentative assent. The same may be said of Diotima's speech in the Symposium. Eros is not presented as an object of theoretical knowledge but as the very movement through which human beings become capable of ascending toward truth. Desire here is not opposed to reason but conditions its exercise. Philosophy begins not with detached cognition but with a transformation of what the soul loves. The ascent toward the Beautiful therefore cannot be understood as the accumulation of propositions but as the gradual formation of a different way of seeing. Taken together, these dialogues suggest that Plato distinguishes between the validity of truth and the recognition of truth. Dialectic establishes the former by examining arguments, exposing contradictions, and clarifying concepts. Myth addresses the latter by reshaping the imaginative, affective, and existential conditions under which philosophical claims become recognisable as true. Unlike dialectical inquiry, whose force depends upon the activity of present interlocutors, myth also possesses a remarkable capacity for transmission. It preserves philosophical

orientation beyond the immediate circumstances of argument, allowing truths concerning the soul, justice, and the good to remain intelligible across generations. In this respect, myth mediates not only between argument and recognition, but also between philosophy and historical time. This distinction explains why the dialogues repeatedly culminate in narratives rather than demonstrations. Myth is not a concession to irrationality, nor a relic of pre-philosophical thought. It is a philosophical medium appropriate to a dimension of truth that argument alone cannot reach. The paper does not claim that myth replaces dialectic or that Plato abandons reason in favour of narrative. On the contrary, myth presupposes the work of dialectic. Only after inquiry has disclosed the limits of discursive demonstration does myth become philosophically necessary. The relation between logos and mythos is therefore neither one of opposition nor simple complementarity. Instead, they represent distinct but mutually dependent moments within philosophical education. Dialectic establishes what is true; myth cultivates the conditions under which truth can be recognised and lived. This interpretation offers a different perspective on the relation between truth and persuasion. Rather than treating persuasion as an external threat to truth or as a merely rhetorical concern, Plato's dialogues suggest that philosophical communication always confronts the problem of recognition. Truth does not simply present itself to an indifferent intellect. It must become visible to a soul whose habits, desires, and imagination have already

been formed in particular ways. The philosophical significance of myth lies precisely in its capacity to transform those conditions of recognition without abandoning the rational aspirations of philosophy itself. Read in this way, Plato's myths are not survivals of an earlier literary culture nor pedagogical devices addressed to less sophisticated audiences. They are reflections on the limits of discursive reason and on the conditions under which philosophical truth becomes capable of inhabiting human life. Plato therefore offers not a retreat from philosophy into narrative, but a deeper account of why philosophy itself cannot dispense with narrative if truth is to become more than the possession of correct propositions.

Keywords: *Plato, myth, logos, mythos, dialectic, persuasion, recognition, truth*

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EMPATHY AND INTENTION

Abstract: *Is it possible for the historian to describe the past as it actually happened? When von Ranke proposed that the task of the historian is to reach an accurate description of an actual past state of affairs, historiography changed radically. Historians in the late nineteenth and most of the twentieth century primarily aimed at historical truth, understood as the correspondence between statements and past states of affairs. However, in recent decades a more sceptical attitude towards the possibility of historical truth in this form (think for example of Hayden White's argument that the historical work should be primarily understood as a narrative) has turned this view into nothing more than naivety. The task of the historian, however, is not merely to externally describe some factual past state of affairs as an independent object. An important part of history is made up of the role of real human beings with personal identities, experiences and stories. The historian needs to take the beliefs, thoughts, decisions and behaviours of historical actors into account in their narrative of some particular aspect of history. This raises the question of the possibility of*

certain and complete knowledge of such facts: how can the historian reach an understanding of the experience of the historical agent? Recent literature on empathy as a method of historical research offers a way to account for historiographical explanations of the experiences, decisions and behaviours of historical agents. In its most basic form, empathy can be understood as reaching understanding of the past by attempting to understand historical actors through an understanding of their mind and behaviour by putting ourselves in their shoes. This notion of empathy has largely arisen out of two influences. The first is the philosophy of aesthetics, most specifically in the writings of Theodor Lipps and his conception of *Einfühlung*, a notion of feeling-into, of a physical imitative resonance between the artwork and the feelings of the observer. The other major influence comes from the hermeneutic tradition, where the notion of *Verstehen* sometimes similarly functioned as some form of inner imitation. In addition to this, a number of other influences can be recognised, such as Robin G. Collingwood's notion of re-enactment, wherein the historian ascertains knowledge of the past through the rethinking of the thoughts of past actors, and Reinhart Koselleck's ideas of the space of experience, or the past as it was experienced by historical agents, and the horizon of expectation, or the expectations for the future of agents in the past. After being largely dormant in the second half of the twentieth century, the notion of empathy has recently enjoyed a resurfacing in various fields. Theorists of

the humanities have turned to contemporary debates in neuroscience and the philosophy of mind on the question of how we know the mental states of others, or to turn it into a more relevant question for historiography: how can we know the mental states of past agents? In answers to this question, a number of positions relating to empathy can be recognised. One example is Karsten Stueber, who argues that our primary way of understanding other agents is through empathy. More specifically, he argues for reenactive empathy, which entails reaching an understanding of the other by internally imitating the thoughts of the other, allowing us to see how certain thoughts formed a reason for the behaviour of the other. Another author who has defended a stronger form of empathy is Thomas Kohut. More strongly than Stueber, Kohut emphasizes the value of imagination in empathy specifically and historical understanding more broadly. According to Kohut, empathy is not merely putting ourselves in the shoes of past actors, but instead it entails imagining ourselves to be another person in the past. However, the question remains how the historian can reach knowledge from an empathic representation of the experiences of historical agents. Here, I propose to turn towards recent literature on authorial intention within the field of literary studies. As mentioned before, the notion of empathy moved to the background of the philosophy of history when attention was alternatively turned towards the narrative character of the historical work and has only recently resurfaced. A parallel development can be

recognised in the theory of literary criticism. One interpretation of the task of the literary critic was to move beyond the text itself and to reach some truth about the intention the author had in writing the text. Understanding a text in this framework consisted of providing a complete account of the author's intention (one can think of E. D. Hirsch for an example of such a position). However, first with the publication of "The Intentionalist Fallacy" and later with Barthes' pronouncement of the death of the author and Derrida's claim that there exists nothing but the text, descriptions of references and allusions of the author were mostly substituted for intertextual explanations. Like the re-emergence of empathy, we can find a resurfacing of intentionality in the theory of literary criticism, be it a more modest version than Hirsch's intentionalism. I will argue that arguments recently formulated (for example by John Farrell and K. G. Arathi) in response to the epistemological problem of discovering the intention of the author, that is the problem of the authorial meaning being inaccessible to the reader, can be similarly used to defend the epistemological validity of empathy as a method of historical understanding against comparable problems (how is the intention of the historical actor accessible for the historian?). Since this defence of intentionalism in literary criticism relies on a layered account of authorial intention, this comparison of historical and literary empathy will additionally allow for a more layered account of the intentionality of historical agents.

Keywords: *empathy, intention, Verstehen, re-enactment, Collingwood, understanding, historiography*

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**STRUCTURED FORGETTING AND THE BROKEN
SUBJECT: INSTITUTIONAL AMNESIA,
STATELESSNESS, AND THE COLLAPSE OF
NARRATIVE IDENTITY**

Abstract: *There is a paradox buried inside narrative identity theory that its most influential architects never resolved. Paul Ricoeur argued that the self is constituted through narrative, that identity is the story a subject tells across time, binding memory, action and anticipation into a coherent whole. Jerome Bruner showed how this narration is never purely internal but is scaffolded by the cultural and institutional resources a community makes available to its members. The paradox is this: both accounts assume that the subject retains enough continuity, enough access to memory and enough social recognition to narrate in the first place. Neither theory adequately confronts the condition in which those very conditions of narration are systematically destroyed, not by trauma alone, but by deliberate institutional design. This paper argues that statelessness and bureaucratic displacement produce a specific philosophical problem that narrative identity theory cannot solve from within its own resources. When a state withdraws documentary recognition from long-settled communities, it does not merely exclude*

them from rights. It enacts what this paper terms structured forgetting: the organized suppression of a community's capacity to narrate itself legitimately into the present. The refugee or denaturalized subject is not simply a person without a story. They are a person whose story has been institutionally declared inadmissible as evidence of their own existence. The conference's central question asks how and when truth operates in narration and renarration. This paper approaches that question from an angle that most contributions to this debate have neglected. It is not only that powerful actors distort or suppress certain narratives in favor of others. The deeper problem is that institutional frameworks can destroy the very preconditions for a subject to produce a recognizable narrative at all. This is a different kind of epistemic violence than the one Miranda Fricker described as hermeneutical injustice, where a group lacks the conceptual resources to interpret their own experience. Here the subject may well understand their experience with great clarity, but the institutional apparatus has rendered that understanding epistemically inert. The archive speaks louder than the witness not because the archive is more truthful, but because it has been granted a monopoly on what counts as truth. This paper introduces the concept of archival supersession to name this monopoly. Archival supersession occurs when documentary bureaucracy is positioned as the authoritative narrator of a person's existence, displacing first-person testimony not on epistemological grounds but on political

ones. The result is a subject who is rendered philosophically unrecognizable, not psychologically disordered, but structurally incapable of securing the social recognition that narrative identity requires. Ricoeur's *idem* and *ipse* distinction, between sameness and selfhood across time, begins to collapse when neither the continuity of the body through documents nor the narrative coherence of the self through testimony is accepted by the state as adequate proof of belonging. The paper develops this argument through close philosophical analysis of a concrete and urgent case. India's Special Identification Register, operating in the political aftermath of the Citizenship Amendment Act, has placed elderly Bengali Partition refugees, including members of the Matua community who crossed the border in the 1940s and 1950s, in the position of having to prove citizenship through documentary archives that either never existed or were destroyed across decades of displacement. For these subjects, the demand for documents is not a bureaucratic inconvenience. It is a philosophical demand that they narrate their own existence through a medium that was never designed to record them and has no obligation to remember them. The methodological approach is broadly continental and interdisciplinary. Close reading of Ricoeur's narrative self and Bruner's cultural scaffolding of identity is placed in direct dialogue with Fricker's epistemology of testimony, Paul Connerton's sociology of social memory and forgetting, and Giorgio Agamben's analysis of bare life and the

reduction of the political subject to biological existence. The case is treated not merely as an illustration of pre-existing theory but as a test that reveals the limits of that theory and requires its reconstruction. Survivor oral testimony and community memory practices among displaced Matua elders serve as philosophical evidence, not as empirical data subordinate to theoretical argument, but as resources that generate philosophical insight in their own right. The paper makes three connected contributions. First, it extends narrative identity theory to account for conditions of institutional destruction, showing that the standard framework requires a political supplement it has so far lacked. Second, it develops the concept of archival supersession as a philosophically precise tool for analyzing how state documentary regimes produce epistemic hierarchy between different modes of testimony about the self. Third, it proposes the concept of enforced narrative incompleteness to describe the specific condition of subjects who possess the capacity and the desire to narrate but whose narration is structurally blocked from achieving social legibility. These concepts are offered not as regional contributions to the philosophy of migration but as tools applicable wherever institutional power organizes the conditions under which certain lives can be storied into legitimacy and others cannot. The broader claim the paper defends is that forgetting is never philosophically neutral. When it is institutionally organized, forgetting functions as a counternarrative in the

most radical sense, not a competing account of the same events, but a refusal to concede that there is an account to compete with. This is the deepest form of communicative distortion that the conference's call for papers identifies. It does not falsify the truth. It forecloses the question of whose truth is permitted to exist.

Keywords: *forgetting, statelessness, archive, testimony, recognition, narration, bureaucracy*

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HEALING THE SHATTERED COGITO: RICOEUR'S NARRATIVE IDENTITY AND THE DECONSTRUCTIVE COUNTER-NARRATIVE

Abstract: *Husserl's phenomenology attempts to provide an exhaustive account of intentionality and sense-bestowing and their relation to the subjective constitution of temporality, thereby establishing phenomenology as a foundational science. Derrida's deconstructive approach identifies Husserl's analysis of temporality as producing a non-presence (différance and the trace), collapsing immediate self-presence. Consequently, Husserl's "thick now" is always "zigzagging into the past and future," leaving the present internally divided. Chiefly, Derrida contends that meaning is not fully present in the sign but is located within a language system safeguarded by deferral. Because the living present arises from non-self-identity, meaning is trapped in the structural play of signifiers. The sign's possibility implies the user's absence, severing language from a "living" origin. As such, Derrida traps the ego within a text that "zigzags" endlessly, deriving meaning from its différance from other words. The reader remains trapped, insulated by the lack of*

immediate presence. Yet Ricoeur and Derrida share a diagnosis: Husserl's phenomenology makes a metaphysical decision. Ricoeur asserts that the core metaphysical error is the assumption that "immediacy precedes mediation," thereby constituting all objectivity within the ego. This creates a circular loop; the ego must be the constituting source of all things and an "identical correlation to other people's intersubjective experience." To escape this loop, Husserl answers with "appresentation," but Ricoeur argues the ego must precede the Other to constitute it. Thus, the system never constitutes a true Other, collapsing 'ego' and 'being.' Indeed, in order for any meaning to arise, there must be an Other through which the ego can reappropriate. As such, neither Husserl's phenomenology nor Derrida's *différance* can truly allow for a second naivety. For Ricoeur, Husserl's ego is abstract and disembodied, a structural problem that causes issues of alterity. Ricoeur states, "[t]he first truth — I am, I think — remains as abstract and empty as it is invincible," positing the ego "has to be 'mediated' by the ideas, actions, works, institutions, and monuments that objectify it." The Husserlian ego is caught in a dichotomy: it either strips away sense data to grasp an object's 'meaning,' or becomes detached from human finitude. This detachment directly implies structural flaws in Husserl's phenomenology. Ricoeur contends the ego must take the "long route" through language, culture, and interpretation. He grafts his hermeneutic method onto Husserl's phenomenology,

developing “distanciation” through the epoché. In the same way that Husserl’s epoché brackets, Ricoeur borrows Husserl’s “epoché” to develop a new meaning through interpretation of the text. He further adds to this through an example of poetry, where poetry allows for “the suspension of ordinary discourse and its didactic intention... is the negative condition that allows new configurations expressing the meaning of reality to be brought to language.” Anticipating objections of “appropriation,” Ricoeur asks whether the interpreting reader reproduces Husserl’s egoic control over the text. Ricoeur replies that appropriation is “not something mental... rather, it is the projection of a world, the proposal of a mode of being-in-the-world, which the text discloses in front of itself by means of its non-ostensive references.” The reader imposes understanding on the text, projecting a world through their horizons. This grants the subject “new capacities for knowing [themselves].” Where Husserl’s ego is a “possession,” Ricoeur’s is a dispossession. Ricoeur concludes that, since the self must take the “long route” to mediated self-understanding, history, memory, texts, and symbols actively participate in our reappropriation and understanding of the world. In this way, retention acts as a continuous force gathering identity over time. Agreeing with Derrida that immediate self-presence is impossible, Ricoeur vehemently rejects language as a tombstone for presence. Ricoeur’s mediation is dialectical, acting as a heuristic fiction and a deliberate distanciation that returns to reality. Meaning

is not lost; the “collapse of the literal” reference functions as a phenomenological *époché*. The collapse of first-degree reference allows second-degree reference to redescribe the pre-linguistic mode of being in the “symbolic infrastructure.” For Derrida, endless interpretation occurs because there is no *telos*; the origin is absent, and endless play is driven by a lack of presence. Conversely, Ricoeur argues that endless interpretation stems from a profound surplus of power emanating from the cosmos, the body, and the sacred. Symbolic institutions possess a lived efficacy that language cannot fully contain. Framing language as the “foam on the surface of life,” Ricoeur asserts the linguistic sign articulates life’s underlying power. The sacredness of nature reveals itself symbolically; the revealing grounds the saying. Ultimately, Derrida traps the ego within the text, whereas Ricoeur pierces through to life’s pre-linguistic power. This pre-linguistic power grounds Ricoeur’s concept of narrative identity, where the self understands itself through narratives. Ricoeur addresses how a self remains continuous over time, dividing identity into *idem* (sameness) and *ipse* (continuity despite change). Ricoeur locates stability in “emplotment,” emplotting existence into a coherent whole. Only through “reconfiguring the world and telling ourselves” can self-understanding occur. Within this reconfiguration, the self makes decisions and realizes itself in successive moments. Ultimately, a continuous self is essential for Ricoeur,

providing the selfhood required to live an ethical life of accountability.

Keywords: *Ricoeur, Derrida, Husserl, phenomenology, deconstruction, mediation, emplotment, selfhood*

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**NARRATING THE SELF: RICOEUR, NARRATIVE
IDENTITY, AND THE RISK OF PERSUASIVE
TOTALIZATION**

Abstract: *The question of re-narration is not merely a question of retelling facts differently. It concerns the conditions under which facts, experiences, and identities become intelligible, persuasive, and contestable. Ricoeur's concept of narrative identity is a privileged site for examining this problem because it understands selfhood neither as immediate self-presence nor as a mere fiction, but as mediated through narrative configuration. However, if identity is constituted through narrative configuration, then the problem of persuasion is not confined to large-scale narratives but reappears within self-understanding itself. Narrative may transform fragmented or conflicting experiences into a coherent plot. This coherence is necessary for intelligibility, but it can also become totalizing when it suppresses opacity, contingency, and, above all, alterity. This presentation thus aims to show the following: Ricoeur's narrative identity occupies the precise point of tension between truth and persuasion. It aims at truthful self-understanding, yet it can do so only through narrative*

configurations that make a life persuasive as a coherent whole. In order to show this, the presentation is divided into three parts. First, it introduces Ricoeur's concept of narrative selfhood. Second, it reinterprets narrative selfhood in light of truth and persuasion. Third, it examines the danger of totalization in the process of emplotment. By the end of the presentation, it will be argued that the persuasive dimension of narrative selfhood lies in the force of narrative coherence, which renders the self and life as a whole intelligible not only for ourselves but also for others. Meanwhile, the truth of narrative selfhood does not lie in the accuracy or completeness of the narratives themselves, but rather in the ceaseless striving for truthful understanding, which can only be approached through indirect mediation. Furthermore, it will be noted that the persuasive aspect of narrative selfhood structurally contains an internal danger of totalization, namely when narrative coherence overrides and integrates otherness, contingency, and opacity into a stabilized form of intelligibility. In the first part of the presentation, Ricoeur's concept of narrative selfhood will be introduced. Ricoeur's narrative selfhood, precisely because it emerges against the background of a critique of the Cogito, does not presuppose self-understanding as immediately given. It is, according to him, always hermeneutically mediated through the dialectic between ipse and idem, that is, between selfhood and sameness. This hermeneutic mediation configures heterogeneous and sometimes discordant elements into a

coherent plot, where what is accidental or fragmented can appear as intelligible. For this part of the presentation, I refer mainly to the Introduction, the Fifth Study, and the Sixth Study of *Oneself as Another*. The second part then asks how this narrative mediation should be understood in relation to truth and persuasion. If narrative configuration makes a life intelligible by giving it coherence, then this coherence also has a persuasive dimension. A narrative self-understanding does not merely say what happened. It presents a life as meaningful, coherent, and communicable. It persuades not necessarily by deceiving, but by making the self appear understandable as a whole. Apart from this persuasive aspect, there must also be an aspect that corresponds to the truthful. However, it will turn out that, by virtue of the temporal and mediated character of self-understanding, truth does not lie simply in the truthfulness of the narrated contents themselves, but in the incessant attempt to formulate them through mediation. The tension between truth and persuasion therefore arises from within narrative identity itself. The final part of the presentation examines the totalizing tendency of narrative selfhood. By briefly discussing criticisms of narrative theory by Strawson, Blattner, and Thomä, I will show that, despite their differences, these critiques point to a shared concern: narrative identity tends to extend partial configurations of experience into the intelligibility of life as a whole. In this sense, the danger of totalization is not merely a problem of large-scale political or historical narratives. It

can also arise within self-understanding itself, whenever the coherence of a self-narrative absorbs contingency, opacity, and alterity into a stabilized image of the self. This structural tendency of narrative will then be reconsidered in relation to the persuasive dimension discussed in the previous part. Narrative becomes persuasive because it makes the self intelligible as a coherent whole. Yet precisely this persuasive coherence can become dangerous when it closes off what resists integration. The presentation therefore ends with an open question: how should we understand this structural predicament of narrative selfhood, and how can narrative identity resist its own tendency toward totalization without abandoning the task of self-understanding altogether? In this way, the paper seeks to clarify re-narration not as the final stabilization of identity, but as the ongoing and fragile mediation between truthful self-understanding and persuasive coherence.

Keywords: Ricoeur, selfhood, narrative identity, emplotment, persuasion, truth, totalization, alterity

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TEMPORAL TURN, (THEN) SPATIAL TURN

Abstract: *Starting from the end of the 19th century, there has been a vivid denunciation – with relevance, I might say, not only philosophical but also with literal and certain public reverberations – of the category of time, derived from the Cartesian understanding of consciousness, one considered to be inauthentic, alienating to the human person, a time affected precisely by an omnipotent and uncritically accepted presence of the paradigm of modern science. In a standard interpretation, the first to react vigorously in this regard was Henri Bergson. This major interest in time is visible not only in philosophy but also in arts and humanities, as well as in psychiatry and psychopathology. In the case of both time and space, it can be considered that the framework imposed by their canonical concepts as they had been understood in modern mathematical natural science and subsequently socially disseminated through public education had become far too narrow, insufficient to capture the complexity and dynamics of both social, cultural, etc. processes, and human spirituality itself (mind, soul, sensibility, etc.) in its protean richness and evolution. Curiously, unlike the category of time,*

the critical and hermeneutic thematization of space will be absent until (somewhat) later not only from philosophy but also the works of the first sociologists, its “founding fathers” par excellence, who assert themselves approximately at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries. I believe this also highlights the somewhat unproblematic nature of its common concept for most thinkers in that period’s social sciences and humanities. My present contribution aims to provide a brief historical analysis and explanation for this cultural state of affairs.

Keywords: *time, space, Bergson, consciousness, modernity, science, sociology*

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**IS MORAL BIOENHANCEMENT PROJECT
COMPATIBLE WITH LIBERAL DEMOCRACY?
SOME CRITICAL REFLECTIONS**

Abstract: *This paper aims to analyze if the moral bioenhancement (MBE) project as a public policy can be compatible with liberal democracy and the demands of egalitarianism, as the proponents (e.g. Persson & Savulescu) of moral bioenhancement argue. Although MBE might not be a bad idea, the way it is defended puts in danger not only the idea itself and the potential benefits of its operationalization, but also the democratic framework in whose service it is. The objection here is that biomedical increasing morality of the citizens (or diminishing moral inequality among people) in a democratic society is parasitical upon the legitimacy (morality) of democracy, endangering the substantive freedom of the individuals. What makes the MBE project indefensible is not necessarily the unintended (undesirable) consequences or the hidden costs (that would be enough to counter the functionalist argument!), but rather the tacit and false presupposition that values-conflict issue can be solved by biomedical means. This*

decisively undermines the democratic argument in favor of the MBE project, since the latter can only be deployed as an enforcement mechanism to equalize moral judgements and values regardless of the intrinsic conflict between values and between values and individual interests. In conclusion, I think that justifying the MBE project as a moral egalitarian democratic mechanism is first, misleading, creating confusions regarding the egalitarian aim and second, contradictory, creating rather conditions for arbitrariness, manipulation and domination than for democratic equality (egalitarianism) and inclusiveness. All these show that the MBE project does not satisfy the demands of liberal democratic egalitarianism.

Keywords: *moral bioenhancement, instrumental and substantial freedom, egalitarianism, democratic equality, morally enhanced majority*

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THE PARADOX OF TRANSHUMANISM: THE SEARCH FOR REST AND CONTEMPLATION IN AN EVER-EVOLVING WORLD

Abstract: *My aim is to explore the philosophical and theological paradox inherent in the modern movement of transhumanism, which advocates for the continuous, endless acceleration of human physical and intellectual abilities. Rooted in Enlightenment thought, particularly the vision of the Marquis de Condorcet, this secularised pursuit of infinite material progress requires vast amounts of energy to battle cosmic entropy and leaves no space for rest. Consequently, humanity risks reversing the Turing test, becoming unstoppable machines devoid of contemplation. In contrast, the Orthodox Christian ascetic tradition, specifically the hesychast practice documented in the Philokalia, posits that true infinite progress culminates in the “spiritual Sabbath”. Drawing upon the theology of St Gregory Palamas, St Maximos the Confessor, and St Isaiah the Solitary, this article examines the essential role of rest, dispassion, and deification. Ultimately, I will try to argue that without a contemplative end-a cessation of worldly activity to rest in*

God--humanity loses its fundamental nature, highlighting the necessity of the spiritual Sabbath in an ever-evolving world.

Keywords: *transhumanism, progress, entropy, rest, contemplation, hesychasm, deification*

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ALGORITHMIC NARRATIVES AND THE (RE)NARRATION OF HISTORY

Abstract: *This paper argues that contemporary AI systems do not merely mediate access to historical knowledge but actively restructure the conditions under which historical narratives and counter-narratives emerge, compete, and gain intelligibility. Moving beyond concerns about misinformation or factual accuracy, the central issue is how algorithmic infrastructures organize visibility, relevance, and interpretative salience within the historical field. Narrative is understood here not as a linear story but as a structured regime of meaning that determines what counts as relevant, connected, and historically significant. Recommendation systems, search engines, and generative AI do not simply retrieve information; they produce patterns of association that implicitly situate users within interpretative communities. In doing so, they generate what may be called algorithmic narration: a pre-reflective structuring of historical understanding through ranked visibility and probabilistic relevance. Within this framework, historical counter-narratives are not simply alternative accounts that exist*

alongside dominant interpretations. Rather, they are filtered, amplified, or marginalized within algorithmically structured regimes of attention. What appears as a pluralistic field of historical interpretation is increasingly conditioned by infrastructural logics that determine which narratives become stable, searchable, and socially transmissible. Drawing on traditions in hermeneutics and narrative theory, the paper suggests that algorithmic systems function as distributed interpretative mediators that partially displace classical epistemic authorities in the formation of historical meaning. The key epistemological shift is therefore not from truth to post-truth, but from interpretative plurality to algorithmically governed regimes of historical visibility that pre-select what counts as a narratable past. The paper concludes by proposing algorithmic narration as a conceptual tool for analyzing how AI participates in the ongoing reconfiguration of historical consciousness, particularly in relation to the emergence, suppression, and transformation of counter-narratives.

Keywords: *algorithms, narration, visibility, relevance, counter-narratives, hermeneutics, historicity*

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INTEREST, KNOWLEDGE, AND TRUTH IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES AND HUMANITIES

Abstract: *I shall defend several theses concerning the relationship between interest, knowledge, and truth in the social sciences and humanities. Propositions, as well as entire theories within the social sciences and humanities that arise from a “purely” theoretical interest, are rare, constituting almost a limiting case. I shall attempt to explain why this is so. The “purity” of epistemic interest neither guarantees nor, by itself, legitimizes theoretical success, just as an interest external to cognition does not, in itself, guarantee failure or delegitimize intellectual insight. I shall seek to demonstrate how and why this is the case. In addition, I shall provide arguments in support of the thesis that an interest-free epistemic standpoint is an intellectual chimera. This leads us to an examination of the relationship between the normative and descriptive dimensions of theorizing, which are not always clearly separable. This, however, does not undermine either the reliability or the epistemic optimism concerning the scope and potential of the social sciences and humanities. Finally, I shall seek to justify why the question of whether*

ideology can be distinguished from science and philosophy constitutes the fundamental task of the philosophy of the social sciences and humanities in the twenty-first century, and how this question relates to the problem of truth and/or application within “practical wisdom”.

Keywords: *interest, knowledge, truth, philosophy of the social sciences and humanities, ideology*

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