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**A Model of Compatibility for Predictive Processing and Embodied Cognition**

Predictive processing (PP) and embodied cognition (EC) have emerged as two powerful approaches within cognitive science in the recent years. This has prompted some to wonder how compatible they might be. The task of sussing out PPEC compatibility is an important one. Not only have PP and EC been heralded as “revolutions” and “paradigm shifts” in cognitive science, but they have also motivated a number of new and interesting areas of research. This talk looks to weigh in on the issue of PP-EC compatibility. After outlining two recent proposals on PP-EC compatibility, I suggest that there are several obstacles that remain. These include (i) explaining the theoretical status of PP and EC, (ii) identifying the theoretical commitments of PP and EC, and (iii) making sense of the notion of compatibility at stake within discussion. I argue that further clarity on these three issues can be achieved by harnessing the resources of Larry Laudan’s “problem solving model” (or PSM). In particular, I suggest that the PSM provides an useful tool for addressing a number of outstanding challenges that face existing accounts of PP-EC compatibility. I conclude by outlining several additional implications of the PSM for PP and EC more generally.

**An Explanatory Challenge to Compatibility Accounts of Predictive Processing and Embodied Cognition**

A number of proposals have recently purported to demonstrate the compatibility of predictive processing and embodied cognition. A common strategy amongst these proposals is to establish compatibility via clarifying the theoretical commitments of the two views. The suggestion is that once the theoretical commitments are appropriately fleshed out the issue of compatibility naturally resolves itself. In this talk, I challenge this ‘theoretical commitments’ approach. I aim to show that even once the theoretical commitments are appropriately settled a form incompatibility can still remain. This is because predictive processing and embodied cognition overlap with respect to their explanatory ambitions. While having different origins and employing different resources, the two views aim to solve similar sets of empirical and conceptual problems. The uptake is that the two views are on a collision course. Moving beyond theoretical commitments reveals a deeper explanatory core in tension. I conclude by charting some of wider implications of this incompatibility for cognitive science.