



**BALKAN  
ANALYTIC  
FORUM**

**BAF2: Dispositions**

**BAF+: Dispositions  
and Values**

Belgrade, Serbia, 2024.



1838

UNIVERSITY OF BELGRADE  
FACULTY OF PHILOSOPHY




# Balkan Analytic Forum

## Dispositions & Dispositions and Values

October 2024.  
Belgrade, Serbia

# BOOK OF ABSTRACTS



1838

University of Belgrade – Faculty of Philosophy  
18–20 Ćika Ljubina Street, Belgrade, Serbia

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**Balkan Analytic Forum 2: Dispositions & Dispositions and Values**  
International Conference, 10–20. X 2024. Belgrade  
Project number 451-03-66/2024-03/200163

*Supported by:* MINISTRY OF SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT  
AND INNOVATION of the Republic of Serbia



Република Србија  
МИНИСТАРСТВО НАУКЕ,  
ТЕХНОЛОШКОГ РАЗВОЈА И ИНОВАЦИЈА

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**BAF2: Dispositions**



## **Iris Vidmar Jovanović (keynote)**

Department of Philosophy, University of Rijeka, Croatia

### *Epistemic Dispositions of Literature*

My aim in this paper is to explore current philosophical debates on the cognitive value of art, primarily in light of Greg Currie's recent attack on the epistemic reliability of fiction. According to Currie, the claim that fiction is a source of knowledge and other cognitively valuable states is a dispositional one: what we mean by it is that art, primarily narrative art, has the capacity to inspire positive cognitive change in the audience. For such a claim to be true however, we need to show that someone has in fact learnt something from art, and this is, Currie argues, hard to do for various reasons. Having extensively discussed these reasons, Currie rejects the view that we learn from fiction, suggesting that philosophical belief in epistemic potency of literature is misguided and lacks any kind of empirical support. In addition, in order to explain the widespread belief that we learn from fiction, Currie proposes to substitute the learning account with the 'pretend learning proposal': what happens in our experiences with fiction is not in fact learning; rather, the audience pretends to have learnt something without actually learning it. In my presentation, I focus on several different elements of Currie's criticism in order to show that his most elaborate claims – the one refuting the epistemic reliability of fiction and the one asking for empirical evidence supporting cognitivists' credo – are not in fact as detrimental to aesthetic cognitivism as he takes them to be. I then turn to his suggestion regarding the pretense account, suggesting that for all its plausibility, it can be refuted. I conclude by sketching my own account of the epistemic dispositions of literary fiction.

**Miloš Adžić** (invited)

Department of Philosophy, University of Belgrade

*Taking the First Step:*

*On What Axioms Are Supposed to Be*

Does Mathematics Need New Axioms? Nearly a quarter-century ago, this question was explicitly posed among experts in set theory, and the consensus was overwhelmingly affirmative. The reasoning was straightforward: set theory, as an integral part of mathematics, requires new axioms to resolve questions left undecided by the standard axiomatization. Gödel's famous program, aimed at uncovering these new principles, has since branched into many deep and intriguing mathematical investigations. Various criteria for identifying new axioms have been proposed, with numerous candidates evaluated against these standards. However, we have yet to identify a single proposition that has gained the widespread acceptance and stature of ZFC within the mathematical community. In this talk, we will explore some of these criteria and, in line with Reinhardt's idea referenced in the title, examine what it means to take the first step: to consider a statement as a genuine candidate for a new axiom of set theory, rather than merely an interesting set-theoretical truth.

**Tomasz Wysocki, Louisa Reins and  
Michael Waldmann**

University of Göttingen, Germany

*A Reluctantly Contextualist Theory  
of Dispositions*

In philosophy, capacities play an important role. Under the guise of powers, the notion has been a staple in metaphysics since at least Aristotle, especially recently enjoying a surge of interest (Bird 2018, Harre & Madden 1975, Kodaj 2024, Vetter 2015). Under the guise of dispositions, the notion has become an important target of analysis for philosophers of science since at least Carnap (Carnap 1928, Cartwright 1999, 2007, Meincke 2020, Quine 1960). Laypersons also invoke dispositions for purposes both practical (“don’t touch it! It’s fragile!”) and explanatory (“he didn’t say that because he’s mean—he’s just a little slow”). Psychology cannot get away without invoking capacities. And in virtue ethics, virtues are also species of capacities. Despite the importance of the concept, there has been virtually no research on how the folk think about capacities. Our research project aims to remedy that, and in our presentation, we will present the results of four experiments initiating this project.

In the first experiment, our participants read a story about an unfamiliar object and its novel capacity. When asked what it meant for the object to have the capacity, the participants preferred a description in terms of causal counterfactuals rather than merely diagnostic (i.e., correlational) conditionals. In the second experiment, rather than a capacity devised by us artificially, we tested the hypothesis using familiar capacities from the philosophical literature. In following experiments, we arrive at a reluctantly contextualist theory of dispositions: disposition ascriptions vary with context, although the ‘standard’ context of a disposition is always taken into account together with the actual context.

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**Timothy Williamson (keynote)**

New College, University of Oxford, United Kingdom

*Recognitional Capacities and their Uses*

A recognitional capacity for an individual or property X is a capacity to recognize, i.e. come to know, without conscious reflection whether something is or has X on being presented with it in a suitable way under suitable conditions. Humans have numerous fairly reliable though fallible recognitional capacities for a wide range of animate and inanimate objects and natural and social kinds. The talk will illustrate the epistemological significance of recognitional capacities through two applications: first, in helping resolve a challenge to knowledge-first epistemology concerning its treatment of evidence acquired through non-deductive inference, and second, in providing a more plausible and realistic alternative to over-intellectualizing accounts of knowledge of moral truths about particular cases as derived by inference from knowledge of general moral principles combined with knowledge of non-moral truths about those cases.

## **Ana Kuburić Zotova**

Independent researcher, PhD University of Belgrade,  
Faculty of Philosophy

### *How Mindfulness as a Disposition Impacts Epistemic Dispositions?*

I will examine the way in which one's disposition to approach present-moment experiences with sustained, non-reactive attention influences how one comprehends and processes information, and ultimately – acquires knowledge. I will use the method of systematic review of psychological, psychotherapeutic, neuroscientific, and philosophical research on the effects of exercising a more mindful awareness of oneself and the environment on cognitive processes. A preliminary review of the literature suggests improvements in perceptual discrimination, comprehensiveness in the perception of observed facts and situations, accuracy in the interpretation of information, evaluation of the reliability of sources, cognitive flexibility – i.e., adapting processing strategies to the situation and responding adequately to unexpected conditions – and openness to new and different hypotheses, etc. These cognitive processes underlie the development of certain epistemic dispositions mentioned by virtue epistemologists and critical thinking theorists.

I aim to consider the impact that a mindfulness disposition has on information processing, viewing information as deliverances of the senses, emotions, and thoughts stimulated by physical objects and events, memories or by artistic and intellectual works. Is a scientist with this disposition epistemically more successful? I have chosen the concept of mindfulness that has been secularized from meditative practices because its effects on cognition have been widely researched in psychology. However, due to the significant similarity between this concept and the phenomenological approach to experience, as well as approaches present in psychotherapeutic meth-

ods such as those of Carl Rogers, Fritz Perls, and Eugene Gendlin, the findings regarding the influence of mindfulness disposition on epistemic success may also be interpreted more broadly. I will discuss the advantages, limitations, and drawbacks that a mindfulness disposition introduces to the set of epistemic dispositions and the dynamics of cognitive processes.

**Key words:** epistemic dispositions, mindfulness, present-moment experience, cognitive flexibility, open-mindedness, perception, awareness.

## João Carlos Salles Pires da Silva

Philosophy Department, Federal University of Bahia, Brasil

### *Competence and Performance:*

### *An Aspect on Ernest Sosa's View on Dispositions*

The point of view of logic is different from that of epistemology. In the *Tractatus*, for example, logic would cross the entire field of the significative, dealing with every possibility (2.0121). For this reason alone, Wittgenstein could indicate this logical condition for an object's knowledge: "If I know an object, I also know all its possible occurrences in states of affairs. / (Every one of these possibilities must be part of the nature of the object.) / A new possibility cannot be discovered later." (2.0123.) In this case, the disposition would imply the object, and knowledge would anticipate all its occurrences, previously determining a rule the meaning of all its possible applications. However, so constructed, the word "knowledge" does not apply to a human epistemic agent, for whom something appearing rational does not imply that it is so, nor does their belief in "p" entail that "p" is true. From the perspective of the epistemic agent, the exercise of competence does not occur without one's performance, so "being in a position to know" must be translated into rational procedures to eliminate error and the risk of negligence.

In our presentation, we will analyze a 1974 text, "How do you know?" in which Ernest Sosa establishes criteria for the subject of knowledge and, thereby, the necessary and sufficient conditions for a virtue epistemology. In this text from fifty years ago, the figure of the subject of knowledge is precisely depicted, but also its reverse, through the use of a fictional character, Mr. Magoo, who lacks the disposition typical of someone who is legitimately in a "position to know." Just as an omniscient being does not know properly, since, by contemplating all cases in advance, He or Her would be unable to reach the truth through the competence as a knower, Mr. Magoo also never allows himself to be surprised by the facts, but because he reinterprets every



deviation as if any fact merely confirmed what he had already anticipated. In both cases, the subject would have neglected what can be brought only by experience.

On the contrary, whoever knows, or whoever can know, must be able to correct their beliefs. After all, as Sosa often repeats, it is part of the knower's proper behavior to "remain wide open to scientific understanding and correction." (SOSA, Ernest, "Dawning Light Epistemology," unpublished manuscript, 2023, p. 4.) Finally, with this reading of how full apt knowledge is constructed (an idea that runs through Sosa's epistemology), his reading about dispositions and competence, as we intend to show, brings him closer to Wittgenstein's critical views on following a rule. Being so, it is not a mere chance nor surprising that, in the current version of his epistemology of virtues (the Dawning Light Epistemology), Sosa dialogues profoundly with Wittgenstein's ultimate reflections – in particular, with *On Certainty*.

**Emily McWilliams (keynote)**

Duke Kunshan University, China/USA

## *Hijacking and Relational Intellectual Humility in Collective Inquiry*

Inquiry aims at epistemic improvement. *Collective* inquiry is a social activity. It serves a broad set of social psychological needs, beyond the epistemic aims of inquiry. Collective inquirers might, for instance, aim to bond with or distance themselves from others; to maintain or shift existing power dynamics; or to express or perform aspects of their identities. When these goals act as a diversion from the epistemic aims of inquiry, they can frustrate the activity itself. They can hijack inquiry.

How should we evaluate hijacking from the perspective of what we owe one another as collective inquirers? I argue that it amounts to breaking a commitment to one's co-inquirers. But my main concern is with cases in which hijacking is epistemically unjust. Analyzing hijacking through the lenses of epistemic injustice and epistemic oppression helps us understand the moral and epistemic situation we are in when we inquire together across divisions of power and think through what we owe one another. It also illustrates how the dynamics of social epistemic activities can maintain and compound unjust and oppressive systems – in the epistemic realm, and writ large.

What should we do to combat hijacking? Amelioration requires systemic change. This takes time and coordinated effort. Given the reality that many of our collective inquiries will continue to take place in contexts of unjust divisions and uses of power, how might we combat hijacking in this context? The second part of the paper explores this question. In it, I argue that one thing we can do is to inculcate a particular virtue that I call *relational intellectual humility* (RIH). I take an ameliorative approach to theorizing RIH: I start from an understanding of the problem we want it to help us overcome, and then theorize a conception of RIH that is up to the task. A frequent criti-

cism of ameliorative approaches is that while they purport to be doing conceptual engineering, what they are really doing is changing the subject. But my conception of RIH is continuous with many prominent theories of intellectual humility, including *inattentive* theories<sup>1</sup>, *relational* theories<sup>2</sup>, and *motivationalist* theories<sup>3</sup>. I conceive RIH as a *set of dispositions to appropriately attend to and care for others' epistemic needs and interests, motivated by care for them as epistemic partners, and a desire to fulfill shared epistemic ends*. I conclude by offering some initial reflections on the philosophical and empirical question of how we can set up our institutions and social structures to facilitate the development of RIH, in order to lay some groundwork for further research on these questions.

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1 Sidgwick 1874; Lewis 1952; Tangney 2000; Roberts and Wood 2003; Robinson and Alfano 2016; Nadelhoffer et al. 2017; Robinson 2021.

2 Dalmiya 2016; Nadelhoffer and Wright 2017; Priest 2017.

3 Tanesini 2018a; 2018b; 2021.

**Jovana Kostić (invited)**

Faculty of Philosophy, Belgrade

*Meaningful Applicability of Concepts*

A theory that aims to deal with formal properties of concepts as abstract entities, which provide meaning to predicates, is also supposed to account for their meaningful applicability. There are at least two reasons for that: it could lead to a not-too-restrictive solution to paradoxes; and it could reveal important distinctions between concepts and sets. To establish such a study, we would need to examine our dispositions to use concepts in a particular way and assess their applications as meaningful or meaningless. This implicit knowledge, which typically helps us identify and avoid meaningless applications of concepts, is then to be translated into principles governing their use. The talk examines the extent to which this is feasible. It touches upon the broader question of whether implicit knowledge can be effectively translated into a formal theory. It also considers which form would this translation most naturally assume: is the implicit knowledge better represented through axioms or through rules of inference characterizing the relation of meaningful applicability.

**Filip Jevtić**

Mathematical Institute, SASA, Belgrade

*Abstractions and Generalizations  
in Mathematics*

For practicing mathematicians, it is often unnecessary for a proper mathematical explanation to strictly follow its foundational, set-theoretical framework. Instead, geometrical methods frequently prove more effective in revealing profound connections between mathematical objects and structures. By emphasizing geometric perspective and embracing geometrical approaches, we can not only uncover the inherent beauty of mathematics but also arrive at generalizations that are more appropriate to the subject matter.

**Slobodan Perović (invited)**

Department of Philosophy, University of Belgrade

*Physical Laws and Initial Cosmological  
Conditions: Philosophical, Theoretical,  
and Evidential Perspectives*

The concept of the universe as finite, governed by a winding-down mechanism according to natural laws, has been advocated since Lucretius. This view has been refined over time by Newton, Kant, key figures in thermodynamics, and more recently, R. Penrose. However, with the advent of Big Bang models, the possibility that physical laws—specifically General Relativity—break down at the initial singularity (the origin point of the universe) became apparent, beginning with Lemaître. Furthermore, some scholars have suggested that quantum mechanics introduces the possibility of a probabilistic origin for the universe near the singularity.

Critics, however, argue that invoking quantum probabilities is merely a way to avoid confronting the epistemic limits of cosmology. Others have proposed alternative steady- and state static models of the universe, primarily to avoid the apparent arbitrariness of initial conditions, which they consider a major epistemic flaw in the standard model (Big Bang), as it deviates from the physical laws governing the universe. The debates that followed led to refinements and variations of these positions, as well as efforts to reconcile them with emerging evidence, most notably the discovery of the cosmic microwave background radiation.

We explore the following possibilities: a) physical laws may result from boundary conditions, rather than guiding them, b) physical laws may vary across time and space, and c) physical laws may approach boundary conditions only asymptotically. Finally, we ask whether these dilemmas are purely operational or epistemic, or whether they also have unavoidable ontological implications.

**Katarina Maksimović**

Independent researcher, PhD University of Belgrade,  
Faculty of Philosophy

*Dispositions and Logical Connectives:  
An Investigation into Deductive Inference  
of Preschoolers*

The idea that the meaning of words can be given in terms of rules that govern their use dates to Wittgenstein. This idea is further developed by Došen in his work on logical constants, and especially in proof-theoretic semantics. According to this type of semantics, the meaning of logical connectives is defined by the introduction or elimination rules for these connectives in the formal systems of natural deduction such as the one formulated by Gentzen. In other words, understanding a connective is closely tied to our dispositions to make certain deductive inferences, given an appropriate set of premises. By investigating the deductive inference of preschoolers, we have gained empirical evidence suggesting that this account of meaning applies to logical connectives (implication, conjunction, and disjunction) used in everyday life.

**Aleksandra Vučković (invited)**

Institute for Philosophy, University of Belgrade, Serbia

## *Can Quine's Naturalism Co-Exist with Virtue Epistemology?*

In this study, I explore whether naturalism – understood in the Quinean ontological sense (Quine 1981) – can co-exist with virtue epistemology, understood as an umbrella term for a wide variety of theories that: a) subscribe to an account of epistemic normativity and b) focus on epistemic agents and their capacities. In previous research, I have shown that Quine's naturalized take on epistemology stems from his ontological commitment to naturalism and that there is a sense of normativity in his epistemic claims as long as he ascribes to an incomplete notion of truth (Vučković 2024), thus satisfying the first condition. But what about the second condition? Is Quine's naturalism inclusive enough to support agent-oriented epistemology?

Abrol Fairweather (2012) argues that any virtue epistemology needs to satisfy the *axiological requirement*, that is, to give epistemic priority to the agent's properties instead of beliefs. Relying on Quine's dilemma on underdetermination and his subsequent choice of sectarian response, Fairweather claims there are moral and psychological dispositions in the background of sectarian scientists' loyalty to the chosen theory. Following Quine's early writing on the underdetermination thesis ([1975] 2014) and his debate with Roger Gibson (Gibson 1986, Quine 1986, Quine 1990), I question Fairweather's conclusion and claim that the loyalty to theory has more to do with pragmatism than psychological reasons.

**Key words:** Quine, naturalism, virtue epistemology, Fairweather, underdetermination, dispositions, sectarian response.



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**Goran Knežević (keynote)**

Department of Psychology, University of Belgrade, Serbia

*Major Dispositions in the Psychology  
of Individual Differences:  
Conceptualization, Measurement,  
Origins, and Consequences*

The psychology of individual differences focuses on dispositions—recurrent behavioral, cognitive, or affective tendencies that distinguish one individual from another. But how do we accurately identify and measure these dispositions? What approaches and methodologies ensure that our taxonomies of dispositions are both comprehensive and parsimonious? How do we determine the importance of different dispositions? Given the continual fluctuations in our moods and states, to what extent are dispositional or trait-like constructs useful in understanding and predicting behavior? How can we assess their relevance, especially when considering the influence of powerful situational and social forces on behavior? Even if dispositions demonstrate stability in the short term, do they remain stable throughout the lifespan, or do they vary significantly? What are the origins of these dispositions?

This lecture will explore these questions, with a particular focus on personality dispositions. The goal is to introduce attendees to conceptual approaches, methodologies, techniques, and the latest advances in the empirical study of dispositions, emphasizing their practical implications and theoretical underpinnings in understanding human behavior.

**Aleksandar Prnjat (invited)**

Alfa BK University, Serbia

*Aesthetic Disposition and Life-Styles  
in the Work of Pierre Bourdieu*

In this text, the author reconstructs and comments on Bourdieu's understanding of aesthetic disposition and life-styles. According to Bourdieu, the aesthetic disposition has a social function: emphasizing the difference between the upper classes and the working classes and underclasses (*les classes populaires*). In addition to having this social function, it is also a historical creation that has its own collective and individual genesis. Bourdieu interprets the aesthetic disposition as a way of socially acceptable perception of works of art, which determines as objects that are socially marked as works of art. These are works that impose their own norms of perception and that demand to be approached with what Bourdieu calls aesthetic intent. He rejects any attempt to interpret the aesthetic disposition essentialistically, that is, beyond this social conditioning. Aesthetic disposition is primarily a matter of perceiving high art, which Bourdieu calls legitimate art. That legitimate art prioritizes form over function, an opposition that Bourdieu sometimes calls the difference between form and substance and which is also operative in matters of taste concerning lifestyles. The very idea of taste is also socially produced and according to Bourdieu is a bourgeois idea because it presupposes freedom of choice. Lifestyles, according to him, immediately separate the have-nots from the haves, assigning to the have-nots the function of serving as a contrast for social distinction. He follows them in various domains including tastes in matters of nutrition. Bourdieu points out that the taste related to food cannot be interpreted independently of its relationship to the world and to one's own body. Each lifestyle can only be interpreted in relation to another, which is its negation. Thus, even in tastes in the matter of nutrition, Bourdieu reveals the division between form

and substance that underlies the aestheticization of all social practices. According to him, social forms during eating have the goal of instilling certain dispositions to discipline eating. To that extent, the dining ceremony in a certain lifestyle of the upper classes is a way to affirm ethical behaviour and aesthetic refinement.

**Key words:** aesthetic disposition, life-styles, Pierre Bourdieu, legitimate art, taste.

**Laura Bujalance**

Universidad Rey Juan Carlos, Madrid, Spain

*Enriching Continental Ethical Debate  
with the Concept of Dispositions  
in Analytic Metaphysics*

This paper explores the relevance and application of the concept of dispositions from Analytic Metaphysics in the realm of Continental Ethics, an area that has traditionally not incorporated this conceptual tool. Despite existing discussions on theories of habits and dispositions in contemporary literature, such as the contributions of Altan et al. (2017) and Henderson and Horgan (2009), these do not address the concept of disposition from an analytic perspective. Dispositions, understood as properties that confer upon objects the power to produce certain effects, offer an enriching perspective for ethical debate, particularly in terms of capacities, abilities, and latent potentialities that do not necessarily manifest in current behavior.

This analysis is based on the key characteristics of dispositions, such as substantial causation, latency, conditionality, and malleability, as well as the distinction between the existence of a disposition and its manifestation, according to Nancy Cartwright (2007). These properties allow for a more robust explanation of causal efficacy and provide a basis for distinguishing between different ontological categories.

It will be argued that dispositions, being inherent to substances and persistent over time, offer a profound understanding of human capacities and their ethical development. By integrating the epistemological and ontological tools of Analytic Metaphysics, a new perspective on Aristotelian mental habits can be offered, showing how these can enrich human nature through their exercise.

Finally, the contributions of key authors such as Gilbert Ryle, Stephen Mumford, Sungho Choi, and Lauren Ashwell, who have developed dispositional analyses of the mind and desire, relevant to this

approach, will be discussed. Ryle's dispositional analysis of the mind (1949), Mumford's exploration of causal powers (2003), Choi's examination of intrinsic interferers (2008), and Ashwell's metaphysics of desire (2013) all provide crucial insights that can deepen our understanding of dispositions in ethical contexts. This paper proposes that an adequate understanding of dispositions can not only clarify the nature of Aristotelian mental habits but also offer a new dimension to ethical debates in Continental philosophy.

**Key words:** dispositions, analytic metaphysics, continental ethics, mental habits, Aristotle, causation, properties.

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**Aleksandra M. Pavlović (keynote)**

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*Dispositions and Brain Health:  
The Role of Premorbid Personality Traits  
in Stroke Risk Assessment*

Mental health and brain health have frequently been regarded as distinct dominions. Nevertheless, the complex integration of mental and brain health encompasses numerous shared pathways that affect both psychiatric and neurological disorders. Poor physical health significantly impacts neuropsychiatric conditions and may be causative of some: for example, stroke can be a consequence of heart disease, brain and spinal cord can be affected by vitamin B12 deficiency due to gastritis, etc. On the other side, psychiatric conditions have been recognized as risk factors for somatic conditions, such as asthma or gastrointestinal and cardiovascular disorders.

Stroke is the second leading cause of death and the primary cause of long-term disability globally. Personality traits emerged as an important factor in stroke recovery and adherence to medications and lifestyle modification. Personality and behavioral changes have been widely studied after traumatic brain injury and stroke and have been associated with lesions of the frontal and temporal lobes. After a stroke, patients often present with maladaptive personality traits associated with negative affect such as anxiety, emotional lability and rigid perfectionism, and interpersonal problems, which correlate positively with avoidant, dependent, and obsessive-compulsive personality disorders.

Although stroke risk factors have been well-studied for decades, they can not be detected in all cases, particularly in younger patients in whom stroke incidence is steadily increasing worldwide. Therefore, there is a quest for novel modifiable risk factors, with inflammatory disorders, infections, air pollution, silent cardiac disorders, and heart

rate and blood pressure variability emerging recently. Pre-stroke personality traits can be added to this list according to recent research. Data from six longitudinal cohorts including over 58,000 individuals monitored long-term showed that elevated levels of neuroticism were associated with an increased risk of stroke, while higher levels of conscientiousness were found to be protective against stroke. This particular finding of higher neuroticism and lower conscientiousness was associated with a steeper cognitive decline and a higher risk of Alzheimer's disease and vascular dementia. The potential mechanisms of these associations are still not clear, but these personality traits have also been related to vascular risk factors, higher inflammation and mortality.

Recent evidence suggests that the etiology of psychiatric and neurodegenerative disorders may partially originate in early neurodevelopment, explained by a complex and still largely unknown interplay of genetic and epigenetic factors. The relationship between the health of the mind, brain, and body seems multifaceted, reciprocal, and yet intuitive but there is a lack of exact mechanisms of these connections, particularly in the disease. There is a need for triangulation of psychological, psychiatric, and neurological aspects of overall body health in large well-designed studies.



**Jelena Pavličić Cerović and Adam Nedeljković**

Institute for Philosophy, University of Belgrade

*Towards an Effective Digital Education:  
Addressing Users' Dispositions to Share  
Epistemically Toxic Content*

Web-based information and communication channels are seen as environments that facilitate the perpetuation and diffusion of 'epistemically toxic content' (a phrase borrowed from Record and Miller, 2022), leading to potentially deleterious societal consequences. Two types of solutions are proposed to mitigate these problems: structural and educational. Proponents of structural interventions (SI) argue for a variety of changes at the level of the digital environment, such as nudging (Thornhill 2019), top-down control (Millar 2019), and others. Proponents of the educational approach (EA) argue that a lack of digital literacy renders users more susceptible to adopting unreliable content. They advocate for the careful development of strategies aimed at identifying content that undermines their epistemic practices (e.g., Pollizzi and Taylor 2019; Guess et al. 2020).

What we aim to show is that both approaches tend to see internet users as overly passive receivers of information who need external guidance to make well-informed decisions. Our goal is to demonstrate that responsible engagement with online information should also consider the active role of internet users, particularly their propensity to create and share unreliable content online. With that said, we propose strategies that include developing the abilities of internet users to minimize negative factors that undermine the reliable use of information channels and to ensure the responsible use of their communicative aspects. The paper concludes with suggestions for cultivating these skills and proposes further research as the foundation for building comprehensive education strategies.

**Key words:** educational interventions, epistemically toxic content, web-based technology, structural interventions, internet users' dispositions.

## Una Popović and Srđan Šarović (invited)

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### *Donkey's Dillema: Values or Valor?*

In this paper, we will address the issue of creating the artwork, with a particular emphasis on the artist's role within that process. The concept of the 'donkey's dilemma' illustrates the artist's position regarding the artwork he aspires to create. When creating artwork, the artist faces a choice: he can either adhere to the inherent principle of the artwork, organizing all steps of making the artwork in alignment with that principle, or he can conform to an existing external principle to which he will adapt and adjust his work. The inner principle guarantees a consistent relationship between the artwork's metaphysical meaning and its physical appearance, ensuring that the principle is clearly manifested in the completed artwork. In contrast, the outer principle refers to any pre-existing idea, ideology, or cultural standpoint that establishes the value framework ascribing meaning and role to objects regarded and recognized as art within that context. The donkey must choose, but in either case, he will bear the burden of his choice. The dilemma lies in determining which burden to carry, which is, as we will argue, a false dilemma. Furthermore, in either case, the artist cannot detach themselves from the moral and ethical implications of his decision concerning the artwork he creates and the guiding principle behind it. Creating according to an inner principle results in an artwork with intrinsic value—value that is inherent to the artwork itself and based on its own principle. In contrast, art created in accordance with an outer principle lacks inherent value; its worth can only be evaluated depending on the value system to which the artist subscribes. In this paper, we will argue that such external values, including commonly understood aesthetic values, are paradigm-dependent and hence relativistic. On the other hand, the true

disposition for an artwork to possess value lies in its ontology—that is, in its internal principle. Thus, to decide between an inner or outer principle in creating artwork is essentially to choose between genuine value – valour, and ‘values’ as imposed perceptions regarding the artwork and its societal significance.

**Key words:** artwork, creation, inner principle, valour, values.

## Milan Popadić (keynote)

Department of Art History, University of Belgrade, Serbia

### *The Concept of Heritage and its Dispositions*

Contemporary museological and heritological literature recognizes the concept of heritage as a key concept of that research field. The elementary definition of the term heritage identifies it as the forms and contents of the past that we cultivate today and consider valuable for passing on to future generations. This general and somewhat vague terminological and conceptual starting point has direct outcomes in the institutional domain, through the function of museum activities and the modes of the protection of monuments of culture and nature. It is the basis of the process of selection, research, protection and communication of museum objects and other forms of cultural properties. Also, numerous cultural and social, as well as political and ideological preferences get involved in it. Can we therefore ask the question what are the dispositions that can be associated with the idea of heritage? Also – if we note that the concept of disposition and the concept of heritage share a common origin in inherited patterns – can we claim that the concept of heritage has actually a dispositional structure, anchored around various surrounding influences, cultural and social upbringing and institutional practices? Finally, can we say that heritage is the dispositional basis of everyday life?

**Key words:** concept of heritage, disposition, cultural and social values, institutionalization.

**Miroslava Trajkovski**

University of Belgrade, Department of Philosophy, Serbia

## *Impredicativity and Dispositional Terms*

In *Thin Objects* (2018) Øystein Linnebo takes that “An abstraction principle is *impredicative* if the terms on its left-hand side denote objects included in the range of some quantifier occurring on its right-hand side; otherwise the abstraction principle is *predicative*.” (p. 97) In “Impredicativity in the Neo-Fregean Program” (2016) Linnebo compares Hume’s abstraction principle for numbers with Frege’s abstraction principle for direction. He claims that the latter is predicative while the former is impredicative, and argues that by restricting the ranges of its variables Hume’s Principle can be turned into a predicative one. Relying on the results of the analysis given in “The Constitutions of Abstract Objects” (Trajkovski, 2021) I argue that some instances of Hume’s principle just appear to be impredicative because its common interpretation is based on misguided formalizations. In the present paper I check the formalization I proposed by applying it on dispositions.

**Key words:** impredicativity, dispositions, abstraction principle.

**Tsarina Doyle**

University of Galway, Ireland

*The Role of Causal Dispositions  
in Nietzsche's Naturalism*

This paper examines the topic of dispositions from a novel and largely unrecognized historical perspective by highlighting the role that dispositional causal powers play in Friedrich Nietzsche's naturalistic philosophy. It examines the role of dispositions both in Nietzsche's development of a distinctive metaphysical form of naturalism and in his efforts to translate the human being back into nature (*Beyond Good and Evil*, 230). It is argued that Nietzsche's critical engagement with the dominant scientific-mechanical account of causality sees him offer a metaphysical and modally dispositional account of natural causality that provides him with the necessary resources to understand both the causal fabric of the natural world and the sphere of human value and normativity as metaphysically continuous rather than dualistically different in kind. In so doing, it is concluded that, in addition to their historical importance, Nietzsche's arguments are of contemporary significance by virtue of their ability to circumvent the dualism of causes and reasons that Joseph Rouse argues pervades left-wing Sellarsian efforts to explain the normative naturalistically (Rouse 2002).

The argument is executed by first establishing that Nietzsche's naturalism entails an emphasis on causality and causal explanations. It is its emphasis on causality that Nietzsche highlights in his praise for scientific method (*The Anti-Christ*, 48–49). However, Nietzsche accuses the scientific-mechanistic account of causality of eliminativism regarding the causal on the grounds that the mechanical account reduces the existence of causes to their manifestation in effects (*Nachlass*, KSA 13, 14 [98]). Focussing on Nietzsche's account of causality in *The Gay Science*, 360 and other related passages, it is shown that Nietzsche understands causes dispositionally and that the appeal

to dispositions avoids eliminating the causal by making causes existentially independent of their manifestation in effects. In a similar manner to some recent arguments in metaphysics, dispositional causal powers, for Nietzsche, are directed to manifesting their natures in effects (Molnar 2003). But they are independent of their manifestations because although these manifestations are not contingent, they are not necessary either (Anjum and Mumford 2018). Moreover, an examination of Nietzsche's account of the causality of human willing in *Beyond Good and Evil*, 19, demonstrates that he understands normativity in the same modally dispositional terms, which accounts for why we do not always do as we are commanded or ought to do. By capturing this ineluctable dispositional element of our motivational and psychological economy, we find that the dispositional does considerable work to safeguard Nietzsche's aim of translating the human being back into nature by avoiding the dualistic separation of the human sphere of normativity from the sphere of nature.

**Key words:** Nietzsche, Naturalism; Science; Dispositions; Normativity.

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## Ognjen Milivojević

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### *Background Powers and Dispositions*

Searle's concept of "Background powers," or simply the "Background," refers to the set of non-representational, pre-intentional capacities of the mind that underlie and enable our intentional states (such as beliefs, desires, and perceptions) to function. These Background capacities include skills, habits, pre-reflective assumptions, and general know-how that are not explicitly represented in our minds but are essential for interpreting and engaging with the world.

On the other hand, dispositions are generally defined as qualities or properties of an entity that predispose it to act or respond in certain ways under specific conditions. In the literature, these actions or responses and the specific conditions are referred to, respectively, as the manifestation and the stimulus condition(s). A textbook example of a disposition is fragility (of an object), where the manifestation is the object breaking, and the stimulus condition is the object being mildly struck. My intent here is to clarify the relation between the "Background" and dispositions.

Vetter (2019) criticizes two prominent dispositional readings of abilities in the current philosophical literature: the view that abilities are dispositions to do what one intends to do, and the view that abilities are dispositions to succeed in doing what one does. Although Vetter does not provide her own definition of abilities via dispositions, she concludes that the existing interpretations are flawed.

Since the "Background" refers to foundational, general abilities of the mind, Vetter's critique is highly relevant to the question of the relationship between the "Background" and dispositions. Acknowledging and building on her criticism, I propose that abilities, and by extension the "Background," can be understood as dispositions whose



manifestation is a positively adaptive, extraphysiological behavior, and where the stimulus condition is an object, event, or environment that prompts the individual to exhibit the said behavior.

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## Saskia Janina Neumann

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Budapest, Hungary

### *Robot Epistemology – Why Knowledge is not Always the Same*

The world is its own best model (Brooks, 1989)! Or at least it is for Brooks' behavior-based robots. Robots such as Herbert, whose task consisted in stealing empty soda cans from offices and Squirt, whose task was to follow around noises, prove that complex behavior such as following specific sounds after a specific time interval, avoiding obstacles and real-time recognition (Brooks, 1990) can be achieved without any inner representation of the world. If we believe Hutto and Myin (2013), we human beings are not too different from Herbert or Squirt. Our behavior can be explained without assuming that we mentally represent our world. In my talk, I want to show evidence against this claim. While some of our behavior might be explainable without us representing the world, most of our storing-behavior of the interaction with our world we have is indicative of us representing the world mentally. My claim will be based on empirical evidence stemming from non-linguistically based spreading activation (Barr et al., 2014), false memories (Roediger, 2001), false recognition (Meade et al., 2007) and the processing of visuospatial information (Foster et al., 2017). I will, furthermore, extend on this theory and argue for human beings being different in knowledge acquisition to behavior-based robots due to the nature of our memory. While behavior-based robots do not need to represent the world, we human beings have to represent the world in a specific manner to be able to continue to act with the world successfully. The knowledge we acquire is mainly based on our inner representation of the world.

**Key words:** AI, Epistemology, Epistemology of Memory, Technology, Philosophy of Technology, Hard problem of content, Radical Enactivism, Enactivism.

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## **Boris Vulović**

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### *Adjunction: On the Paths of Inferential Synonymity*

This lecture focuses on the concept of adjunction, which lies at the heart of categorial proof theory and also of general proof theory. The primary emphasis is on tracing the paths from assumptions to conclusions. Given the multiplicity of such paths, the key question becomes how to establish criteria for their identity. In this context, category theory offers insights into a fundamental philosophical question in general proof theory: What constitutes a proof? Adjunction can be understood as an equivalence relation that is only partially realized—a ‘halfway equivalence.’ Homomorphic relations between functors serve to reinforce this partial equivalence between categories. Thus, the notion of proof synonymity can be illuminated through this framework.

**Nikša Konjević**

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*Language and the Universe:  
Definability as an Inherent Property of Sets?*

In this lecture, I aim to demonstrate how certain interesting properties of the universe of sets and set-theoretic results can serve as compelling evidence that sets inherently possess a disposition to behave as well-defined objects within our formal language. Specifically, I will argue that if we assume the definability of sets in a particular manner, it becomes possible to formulate an axiomatization that offers a complete and thorough description of the universe of sets, without restricting it to any specific parts. Contrary to the prevailing belief among set theorists, I contend that constructing the set-theoretic universe as a class of formally definable objects does not impose artificial linguistic constraints. Rather, the evidence presented will show that this approach arises naturally from the inherent property of sets to be well-definable within our language.

## Uroš Dučić

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University of Belgrade

### *How to Individuate Potentialities*

According to Barbara Vetter, stimulus conditions should not play a role when it comes to individuating dispositions. Her view is that we should individuate dispositions solely by their manifestations, while also rejecting the conditional approaches to analysis of disposition ascriptions. Vetter denies that there is an important link between dispositions and counterfactual conditionals. Instead, she claims that the expression “ $x$  can  $M$ ” ( $x$  being a particular object and  $M$  being the relevant manifestation) describes the nature of dispositions in a more perspicuous way. Thus, she refers to her approach to understanding dispositional properties as the “possibility conception of dispositional properties”. Vetter, however, understands the notion of possibility, and metaphysical modality in general in a different way in comparison to most contemporary metaphysicians. Namely, the key notion in Vetter’s theory is that of *potentiality*, historically most notably described by Aristotle. Vetter’s broader project is to provide an understanding of metaphysical modality in terms of potentialities. Her view on how dispositions relate to potentialities is straightforward: Every disposition is a kind of potentiality, and non-dispositional potentialities exist.

Recently, Nathan Wildman has provided a couple of challenges for Vetter’s theory. In this paper, I will devote my attention to his challenge based on the problem of the individuation of potentialities. Wildman suggests that there seems to be an issue with the idea that potentialities should be individuated solely by their manifestations. Namely, some potentialities appear to have identical manifestations, while belonging to objects of a different kind. The idea that potentialities that apply to different kinds of objects are identical seems counterintuitive. The proponent of conditional analysis could, perhaps, avoid the

problem by showing the necessary connection between stimulus conditions and the nature of objects. Therefore, the proponent of Vetter's analysis of disposition ascriptions should try to meet this challenge.

The main goal of my paper is to explore the strategies for addressing the problem of individuation of potentialities. I argue that, despite Wildman's challenge, it would be plausible to stick to the original individuation conditions of Vetter's theory. After analyzing additional examples of dispositional properties, I will explain why the counter-intuitiveness worry should not lead us to prefer conditional analyses.

**Key words:** potentiality, conditional analysis, metaphysical modality, individuation of potentialities.

**Dušan Smiljanić**

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## *Disposition: A Property or a Mode of Existence?*

When we inquire disposition, our question goes like this: “What is disposition?” And when we ask this, we inquire, “Is a disposition some *property* or a *mode of existence*?” But, in asking like that, we already assume the difference between a property as an *ontic character* of being and a mode of existence as an *ontological character* of being. In both cases, a disposition is viewed as a *characteristic of* something, and so like something predicable, and not substantial. In the first case, in its ontic meaning disposition is viewed as a characteristic of property (or something akin to a *property of property*), and in the second, as a *characteristic of* or *mode of existence*. Regardless, we now see that to adequately understand what disposition is, it is necessary to investigate whether the concept of *ontological difference* (by which we think on the difference between existence and being (like property or some particular entity), and the idea of manifold modes of existence) refer to something real and if does, is it helpful theoretical instrument or not. If it does refer to something real and it is helpful, then our task would be to determine whether disposition is a property or a mode of existence. If it is a mode of existence, then which mode it is and what is its inner structure? If it is not mode of existence, then our task would be to determine which type of property it is and what it means to say that something is a property of property? Thus, our inquiry will be twofold: we will attempt to explore, by investigating the subject of disposition, the question of ontological difference, and, by investigating ontological difference, we will attempt to grasp the essence of disposition.

**Key words:** disposition, property, modes of existence, ontology, semantics, logic.





BALKAN  
ANALYTIC  
FORUM

**BAF:** Invited  
guest lectures

**Iris Vidmar Jovanović**

University of Rijeka, Croatia

## *Reconsidering Kant's Theory of Art*

Over the last several years, poetry made a big entrance into contemporary philosophy of art. Neglected for centuries by analytic aestheticians, it is now rapidly gaining attention and numerous philosophical problems posed by poetry are discussed extensively: a matter of meaning, of poetic language, of visual imagery, of abstraction, of fictionality, etc. Surprisingly however, contemporary theories of poetry rarely consider Kant's views on poetry. I find this odd, given that his theory of poetry – though arguably not quite presented as a theory – is immensely resourceful for addressing, and solving, numerous issues that arise in our contemporary thinking about poetry. Thus, my aim here is to rectify this omission in contemporary philosophy of poetry by pointing to some of the insights Kant has to offer for our theories today.

Kant valued poetry above all other forms of art and though he can hardly be said to have developed a theory of poetry, he often makes references to it in those paragraphs of the third *Critique* dedicated to fine arts (§§43–54). His interest here is not finely grained, and extends from delineation of art from other human activities, to genius and artistic creation, to the relation between art and morality, to comparison of various forms of art. Throughout these paragraphs it is not always clear whether Kant is describing the act of poetic creation or the process or engagement with poetry. However, by carefully tracing his references to poetry, I argue, we can come up with a rather comprehensive view of it, a view which can greatly enhance our understanding and appreciation of poetry, as well as our understanding of what makes poetry unique within all other forms of linguistic and artistic expression.

## Timur Cengiz Uçan

Bordeaux Montaigne University Sciences, Philosophy,  
Humanities Mixed Research Unit, France

### *Achievement and Completion: Dispositions in the Middle Works of Sartre and Wittgenstein*

The objective of this paper is to propose a reflexion about the place and eventual contribution of dispositions to our understandings, explanations and conceptions of actions, in our lives. Indeed, some actions can in determinate circumstances satisfactorily be understood and explained by means of the ascription of a disposition to an individual or collective person. But it is not the case that the application of such schema of explanation to each and every action would each time turn out sufficient, and even less, adequate, to understand and explain the considered action. For example, although in a context the correct affirmation that a team won due to one's motivation can constitute a sufficient explanation of the realization or achievement of the action, in another context the same affirmation about the same team and event can turn out insufficient, notably due to the increased knowledge and curiosity of the persons who interrogate themselves about a reason for which a team won. To this extent, two mutually incompatible demands may seem to coerce our concept of disposition. The first is the demand of the acknowledgment that the concept of disposition is a thick concept, in the sense that we ordinarily need to and do distinguish between ways in which we achieve or are *achievers*. Not only our past actions, but also our knowledge of, and our attitudes with respect to our past actions contribute to the understanding, the conception and the realization of new actions, to the practical enrichment and deepening of experience which can result from our actions. The second demand concerns the claim according to which we do what we do because of the dispositions we have. Understood literally, its truth seems incompatible with the very applicability of the concept of

agency inasmuch as on its basis, the analyses of our actions should turn out to provide us *the analyses of the actions of dispositions*, rather than *the analyses of our actions*. In some sense, it could turn out that we would somehow be acted by dispositions, rather than acting by ourselves, in a central and basic range of cases. First-person authority, in the sense of authorship, could thus turn out to be a mere (grammatical and philosophical) illusion. However, are dispositions really meant, as such, to ground our understandings, explanations and conceptions of human actions and behaviors? For the acknowledgement of the ordinary thickness of the concept of disposition could not be equivalent with the acknowledgement of the philosophical move which consists in presenting (our knowledge of) dispositions *as grounds for knowledge as such*, and for knowledge of human action. During my talk I will attempt to elucidate that both Sartre and Wittgenstein have remarked that such move generates in fact most of the difficulties the realization of such move is meant to solve, and propose an explanation of their alternative conceptions of dispositions. To achieve this objective, in the first part of my talk, I will propose a comparative study of Sartre's treatment of "the problem of the being of possibles" in *Being and Nothingness* (Part II, First Chapter, iv), with Wittgenstein's treatment of a "paradox which lies in our saying that something which is indeed not the case is nonetheless possible" (VW, 2003, 39), so as to elucidate the convergences of their ways of addressing a central difficulty about our expressions of dispositions. Then after having briefly considered some convergences of the thoughts of Sartre and Wittgenstein with the ones of philosophical pragmatists (notably Peirce and C. I. Lewis), and having distinguished naive dispositionalism from philosophical pragmatism, I will propose a comparative study of the importance of the criticism of dispositionalism for their criticisms of causalism and metaphysicism. In the second part of my talk, I will attempt to elucidate that accounting for disposition as action, for the importance of disposition as a practice, is required both according to Sartre (in *Being and Nothingness* and *Notebooks for an Ethics*) and Wittgenstein (in the *Brown Book* and *Logic*) to account for action.

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## Emily McWilliams

Duke Kunshan University, China/USA

### *Epistemic Injustice and Inquiry*

When and how are we subject to epistemic injustice as inquirers? A natural answer appeals to our collective understandings of epistemic injustice and of inquiry: it occurs when what we understand as epistemic injustice prevents us from engaging successfully in what we understand as inquiry. I argue that this approach gives us too narrow a view of how we experience epistemic injustice as inquirers.

The traditional, Frickerian framing of our notion of epistemic injustice was conceived against the backdrop of 20<sup>th</sup>-century analytic epistemology's focus on analyses of epistemic success states like knowledge and justified belief. It focuses on ways that knowers can be unjustly undermined in their capacity to attain and to communicate epistemic success states like knowledge, justified belief, and understanding.

Inquiry is a process rather than a state. It often takes place in community and in collaboration with others. It highlights our fundamental epistemic dependence and interdependence. I propose and demonstrate an approach on which we start by considering what we need to become good inquirers and to inquire well, and then consider ways in which these needs can remain unmet due to systemic injustices. My discussion produces two key results: it broadens our collective understanding of epistemic injustice, and it shows that our needs as inquirers extend beyond times when we are engaged in processes of inquiry.



BALKAN  
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**BAF+:** Dispositions  
and Values



## **Amber Riaz (keynote)**

Lahore University of Management Sciences, Pakistan

### *Becoming Virtuous*

Moral learning is a complex process that fundamentally involves the acquisition and refinement of key dispositions, such as what features of a situation to pay attention to, and how. This developmental journey is predominantly experiential, occurring through real-life encounters and interactions that shape our moral sensibilities. In this talk, I explain these ideas with the help of some illustrative examples. These examples will demonstrate the nature of experiential feedback in moral learning and how it helps attune us to morally salient aspects of various situations. They will also highlight the crucial role of experience in developing moral competence, underscoring the limitations of purely theoretical approaches to moral education. On the way, I refer to recent advancements in psychology and cognitive science that lend credence to this experiential model of moral learning.

**Damir Smiljanić (invited)**

Department of Philosophy, University of Novi Sad

*Cool Philosophy or the Art of Restraining  
from Judging without Being Indifferent*

Although philosophy is primarily based on the exchange of arguments in support of a thesis or against the opposite claim, it is also based on certain cognitive and even value *attitudes* that support the argumentation. When discussing a problem, philosophers *care* about being “right”, not their opponents. If their argumentation were not guided by such an attitude, the discussion would turn into an arbitrary sequence of statements without focus on the very matter. The problem arises in the case of self-reflection – when philosophers realize that they are starting from certain presuppositions that limit their attempt to solve the problem – or meta-reflection – when it becomes clear that a consensus cannot be reached in the discussion due to the different starting points of its participants. The consequence of that insight can be a distance from one’s assumptions or the assumptions of philosophizing in general. To achieve such (self)distancing, it is necessary to take a different attitude in the discussion – or not take it at all! The task of the presentation is to investigate the *suspension of the attitude*, which avoids one-sided identification with one point of view and enables a broader view of the constellation in which representatives of different positions are involved in the discussion of a problem. In the history of philosophical thought, there have been attempts to formulate such a neutral habitus: Pyrrhonians sought *suspension of judgment (epoché)*, Adam Smith proposed the instance of an *impartial spectator* during the assessment of morally sensitive situations, Max Weber advocated *value neutrality* when dealing with science. The key question is whether the restraint we are discussing here rests on a special (personal) *disposition* or *value attitude* gradually built up and accepted with full awareness. *Indifference* as a character disposition is not suitable as a basis because it is

essentially anti-theoretical. Another basis must be found on which to build distance from philosophical biases, and it will include *coolness* (in the sense of the absence of strong emotions) and *prudence*, but at the same time *engagement* in the matter because without this philosophy loses its seriousness.

**Key words:** argumentation, disposition, value attitude, restraint, impartial spectator, value neutrality, Pyrrhonians, Adam Smith, Max Weber.

## **Douglas J. Huntington Moore**

Independent researcher, PhD, Former Association:  
Director Grabba International, Australia

### *Disposition, Value, and the Quantum Object*

We begin with the concept of a “quantum object,” an entity governed by quantum mechanics, markedly diverging from classical mechanics. This transition signifies a shift from a categorical to a dispositional paradigm, facilitated by the probabilistic wave equation at the heart of quantum theory. This equation prompts a shift from absolute determinism to probabilistic dispositions, redefining the quantum object within a paradigm where values and probabilities supplant certainty.

Addressing the indeterminacy of quantum objects necessitates a metaphysical approach, akin to Aristotle’s “First Science,” which focuses on entities of undetermined genus. By applying Dirac’s razor, quantum mechanics may eschew metaphysical speculations, focusing instead on empirical results, thus aligning with the methodologies of the special sciences.

Our exploration positions the quantum object as akin to Anaximander’s apeiron—the Unbounded—or the monad as conceptualized from Pythagoras, Euclid, through to Leibniz, an entity of undetermined cardinality. We adopt Leibniz’s Predicate in Notion (PIN) principle as our sole framework, thus maintaining the harmony intended by Leibniz and circumventing Kant’s critique.

Leibniz’s metaphysics, which posits an extensive collection of monads, encounters complexities akin to those addressed by ZFC set theory, which avoids paradox by defining everything as a set whilst eliminating troublesome proper classes and non-set elements via axioms. Employing only PIN, we propose an innovative approach without axioms, inspired by Leibniz’s envisioned method but evading paradoxes.

To achieve the necessary breakthrough, we redefine a monad not by its properties but by its dispositions, symbolized by  $M$ . This redefi-

dition preserves the harmony that “everything is a monad,” whereby the disposition M that a monad F possesses must also be a monad. Consequently, F and M are formalized as two generic dispositional genders: feminine F, embodying potential, and masculine M, representing actualization.

The metaphysical distinction between F and M lies in their dispositional genders; they are different yet indistinguishable as one has a value and the other is that value. Dirac’s Exclusion Principle is uniquely applied here, differentiating F’s multiplicity from M’s singularity. F and M denote the dual quantum states of the generic object O, where only one monad can occupy the M state, while many may reside in the F state.

The states of F and M exist in superposition within O. Naively, at any moment, a monad in O may assume the M state, with the remainder in the F state, preserving the principle of non-distinguishability or “First Classness.” Less naively, both states can be thought of as superpositions. This arrangement mirrors the quantum object O to a qubit, with binary numeric states  $\langle 0, 1 \rangle$  replaced by qualitative dispositional genders  $\langle F, M \rangle$ .

Employing dispositional gender as a key principle, along with other innovations, I posit that we possess the elements to complete Leibniz’s project, transforming metaphysics into a true science. The envisioned qualitative mathematics, including qualitative geometry, will be based on the binary dispositional pair  $\langle F, M \rangle$ , rather than the quantitative  $\langle 0, 1 \rangle$  of current mathematics.

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**Thodoris Dimitrakos (invited)**

University of Patras, Philosophy Department, Greece

*Naturalistic Epistemology, Normativity,  
and Scientific Realism*

The dispositional accounts of justification in epistemology are part of a general naturalistic turn in contemporary analytic philosophy. These accounts suggest that a belief is justified when it is produced by a particular set of dispositions, and they are naturalistic insofar as they reject a priori justification. The counterpart of this naturalistic view in the philosophy of science is the rejection of a priori determination of scientific normative rules or the method of science. According to this perspective, questions about the methods or the normative standards of science can be answered in the same way as questions about the natural world, namely through empirical research. The aim of this paper is to examine the relationship between scientific realism and naturalism with regard to scientific change and, consequently, the issue of epistemic normativity. The main question that needs to be addressed is as follows: If the evolution of scientific theories should be understood solely as a natural phenomenon, as naturalism implies, can truth play an active role in this evolution, as scientific realism entails? In order to address this question, I will critically examine Richard Boyd's account, which is an attempt to combine scientific realism and radical naturalism. Subsequently, I will argue that Boyd's view requires sacrificing either the radical version of naturalism or the defense of the autonomy of scientific rationality. Finally, based on this argument, I contend that scientific realism is compatible only with a liberal rather than a eliminative version of naturalism.

**Irina Deretić (keynote)**

Department of Philosophy, University of Belgrade

*Being Disposed to Commit Suicide?*

*The Case of Anna Karenina*

The objective of this presentation is to examine the theme of suicidal intention and the underlying motivations for committing suicide, as portrayed in Tolstoy's novel *Anna Karenina*. The analysis will focus on the potential reasons for suicide in individuals who do not possess a natural inclination towards it. Additionally, a detailed exploration of Anna's interconnected motives for suicide, along with the identification of her dominant motive, will be undertaken. Furthermore, the presentation will encompass a discussion of the actions of Anna's lover after her demise, along with the philosophical contemplations on the meaning of life by the co-protagonist, Levin. These instances will serve to illustrate that individuals are not predisposed to commit suicide.

**Key words:** Suicide, suicidal intention, *Anna Karenina*, Vronsky, Levin.



**Marcin Trepczyński (keynote)**

Faculty of Philosophy, University of Warsaw, Poland

*Virtues as Dispositions: The Most Surprising Approaches in Medieval Analytic Thought*

Is virtue a disposition? Can we understand the Greek “hexis” used in the Aristotelian definition of virtue as a kind of dispositions? Were virtues considered as dispositions in medieval philosophy and theology? I am going to show: that definitions of virtues represent different approaches with respect to the first question, that the Aristotelian and that medieval analytic thinkers who developed interesting theories concerning virtues and the concept of habitus, were not unanimous in this matter. In my paper, I refer to an interesting fragment from Peter Abelard’s Ethics, and compare it to the approach of his disciple John of Salisbury. Next, I present ideas of Alain of Lille and Simon of Tournai, as well as fragments from recently edited and published \*Quaestiones Theologiae\* by Stephen Langton, to conclude with the theory provided by Thomas Aquinas. The analyses provided by these authors show that disposition was differently conceptualized by medieval analytic authors, and that this concept was not always fitting to the concept of virtue.

## Stefan Mičić

Department of Philosophy, University of Belgrade

### *On Dispositional Moral Realism*

In this lecture, I will explore Dispositional Moral Realism, a version of moral realism grounded in dispositional properties. It advances the view that moral values, similar to secondary qualities such as color, are dispositional properties dependent on the responses of evaluators under appropriate conditions. Unlike traditional forms of moral realism, which treat moral properties as independent of human attitudes, Dispositional Moral Realism claims that moral properties are grounded in naturalistic facts about human dispositions while avoiding the reductionism found in some dispositionalist theories. After outlining the main characteristics of Dispositional Moral Realism, I will address some prominent critiques, such as Crispin Wright's critique, which argues that dispositionalism cannot explain the appropriate conditions for moral judgment without circularity, Allan Gibbard's argument that full-information accounts fail to provide normative guidance in the face of coherent disagreement, and Mark Johnston's "So what?" objection, which questions how dispositional theories can account for the commendatory force of moral judgments. I will examine whether Dispositional Moral Realism overcomes these critiques by clarifying that moral truth, on that view, is determined by our complex moral sensibility, including second-order dispositions that regulate and refine our moral responses. The theory accommodates a modest form of moral relativism by allowing evaluators from different cultures to have divergent but internally coherent responses. I will argue that Dispositional Moral Realism offers a middle path between traditional moral realism and non-cognitivist theories, affirming that moral facts are real but contingent on human sensibility.

**Key words:** Dispositional Moral Realism, disposition, sensibility.

## Aleksandar Risteski

University of Priština in Kosovska Mitrovica,  
Faculty of Philosophy, Department of Philosophy

### *The Anthropological Implications of Peirce's Aesthetics*

In this paper I will focus on Peirce's views on aesthetics and some of its anthropological implications. Foremost, I want to address Peirce's notion, in C.P. 5.314–315, that a “man is the thought”, from the view of his aesthetics.

Firstly, I will pay attention to the relationship between Peirce's and Plato's views on feelings and the importance of aesthetical education. Plato provides one of the earliest accounts on the importance of aesthetical education, especially at early age. In *The Republic* Plato views the ability to appreciate art and to discriminate beautiful from ugly as a sort of preparation for ethical and theoretical differences and preferences (*Resp.*386aff). Thus a person that is more capable of appreciating beauty, will more likely to be able to tell the difference between right and wrong, or true and false. Peirce's reflections on aesthetics do unveil interesting views in that regard. Like Plato, Peirce sees aesthetics and aesthetical categories as fundamental to acting and thinking. Though he did not develop a systematic account on aesthetics, he was aware of its importance for ethics and logic and that he had “terribly neglected” it (C.P. 2.199). He also confessed to James that he had realized the importance of aesthetics, later in his career (C.P. 8.225–8.256). Aside of that, some scholars, like Parret, claim that even though Peirce considered himself mostly as a logician, his “encounter with philosophy was through aesthetics” (Parret, 1994). My task is to show that Peirce's views on the “qualities of feeling” and the aesthetical experience in general do have interesting philosophico-anthropological implications too.

**Key words:** aesthetics, Peirce, philosophical anthropology, qualities of feeling, values.

## Natalia Tomashpolskaia

Independent researcher, PhD University of Malaga, Spain

### “Good” and “Beautiful” ≠ “agreeable”

This paper will discuss Wittgenstein’s criticism of the dispositional theory of values. Concerning aesthetics, Wittgenstein argued: “Beautiful” ± “agreeable” (MWL 2016, 346) Aesthetics is not a matter of taste. ‘The question of Aesthetics is not: Do you like it? But, if you do, why do you?’ (ibid., emphasis in the original). ‘If ever we come to: I like this; I don’t, there is an end of Aesthetics; & then comes psychology’ (ibid., 347). Tastes and conventions are not aesthetics but a subject matter of psychology. Wittgenstein added that ‘rules of harmony’ ‘always presuppose that we shall understand that obeying these rules makes things more agreeable (ibid.). For Wittgenstein aesthetics is not and cannot be a part of psychology, he distinguishes these two realms strictly. ‘I think one thing is clearer: one could sum up: Aesthetic reasons are given in the form: getting nearer to an ideal or farther from it. Whereas Psychology gives causes why people have an ideal’ (LC 2016, 355; May 22, 1933). ‘(Ethics and aesthetics are one.)’ (TLP 6.421) However, ethics is ‘the most essential part of what is generally called Aesthetics’ (LE in PO 1993, 38). In *LE*, Wittgenstein emphasised that a ‘certain characteristic misuse of our language runs through *all* ethical and religious expressions’ (PO 1993, 42; italics in the original). When we use a word in the ethical, aesthetical, or religious sense, its meaning is not the same but *similar* to the meaning of this word used in a trivial sense. For instance, ‘all religious terms seem in this sense to be used as similes or allegorically’ (ibid.). In 1945 Wittgenstein explained that ‘the *Sitten und Gebräuche* (morals and customs) of various tribes’ *is not* and *would not* be ethical. Wittgenstein came to the statement that describing the morals, customs, habits, and cultural behaviour of nations would not be the same as studying rules and laws. Accordingly, ‘A rule is neither a command nor order — because there is

no one that gives the order — nor is it an empirical statement of how the majority of people behave’ (Citron 2015, 27). Moreover, for Wittgenstein, a rule is neither a command nor a sociological description. The different ways in which rules are used are determined by their different grammar. ‘There are special features in regard to ethics, because in ethics there isn’t generally proof’ (ibid., 28). Wittgenstein was speaking about the *plurality of ethical systems*, understanding here by ethics, common morals and customs of a society. ‘If anyone says that something is good, he is making a judgement of value. If I decide that a certain ethical judgement is true — or that a certain system of ethics is the right one — then I am also making a judgement of value. In other words, I should be adopting that system of ethics, or making the same ethical judgement’ (ibid., 29). These ethical systems are analogous to language-games, where a person adapts a system with its statements and special rules. But no system is better than another, in this case, we cannot say that only one system must be the right one. If we want to distinguish between a right one or a wrong one, it means that we adopt ‘certain ethical criteria’ (ibid.). ‘Idea of logical criticism, or ruling out certain ethical systems on the ground that they are incoherent. This would need further examination’ (ibid.). Further, Wittgenstein continued that there is a plurality of world-views, but there is not any world-view better than another. All of them are significant equally. ‘One could say ‘every view has its charm’, but that would be false. The correct thing to say is that every view is significant for the one who sees it as significant (but that does not mean, sees it other than it is). Indeed, in this sense, every view is equally significant’ (PO 1993, 135). If a person says that one ethical system is more ‘right’ than another from his or her point of view, it means only a subjective attitude, ‘that each judges as he does.’ Wittgenstein criticised both the value statements and the idea of reason regarding ethics. ‘If you simply take the expression of the judgement — say ‘ah’, together with a facial expression, — this might be the same for an excellent salad, a great painting or a noble action’ (Citron 2015, 30). In 1931, in his diaries, Wittgenstein wrote that an ‘ethical proposition is a personal act’, we are taught to consider something as good because other people said

that it is good. If it makes an impression on a person and causes admiration, then this ethical proposition becomes worthy for this person, otherwise vice versa (PPO 2003, 85). During a discussion with Schlick of the concept of 'value', Wittgenstein emphasised: 'I would reply that whatever I was told, I would reject, and that not because the explanation was false but because it was an *explanation*' (WWC 1979, 116; emphasis in the original); and further he continued: 'What is ethical cannot be taught' (WWC 1979, 117).

**Đorđe Vukašinić**

PhD student, Department of Philosophy,  
University of Belgrade

*Enriching Understanding by Finding Limits  
of Knowledge in Mathematics:  
On the Philosophical Significance of Forcing*

Forcing is exceptionally powerful technique for constructing models of set theory developed by Paul Cohen in 1963. Initially, this technique was utilized for the purpose of dealing with the question of independence of the continuum hypothesis. However, forcing found quite wide range of applications in the realm of proving independence of other set-theoretical claims with respect to the standard axiomatization of set theory, resulting in a great explosion of independence result in the second half of the last century.

If mathematical knowledge claims can be made at all, it can be maintained that the realm of knowledge within mathematics is encompassed by adopted axioms of set theory. Vastness of unknown, therefore, consists of claims independent of adopted axioms. Not all of the independent claims can be considered as something that we do not know, as it will be shown. Contrary to that, there are simple and natural, yet currently unsolvable problems within set theory that are true basic bearers of what was called unknown. These questions and the way that forcing provides fine conceptual analysis of set-theoretical notions relevant to them will be explored.

## Isidora Novaković

PhD student, Department of Philosophy,  
University of Belgrade

### *Dispositions to Tragic Emotions*

We say that a glass has a disposition to shatter even when it doesn't break. Objects have dispositions which do not have to manifest in their behavior. Still, these dispositions will manifest if the certain conditions are met. This paper aims to illuminate whether there are dispositions to tragic emotions and what evokes them. The question of dispositions to tragic emotions can be approached from various angles. We can investigate the characteristics of subjects, recipients, prone to react to tragedies in certain ways. Yet, our focus will be on the other approach to the question, namely, if there is something in the tragedy itself that makes us feel certain emotions. We can also investigate various types of scenarios characteristic of Greek tragedy. In order to achieve this goal, we will focus on Aristotle's understanding of tragic suffering from *The Poetics*, as well as his understanding of tragic emotions (fear and pity) from *The Art of Rhetoric*.

Our starting point will be the analysis of Aristotle's definition of tragedy. The key components of the definition in our investigation of the main question will be the *dramatis personae* in action and the evocation of fear and pity. Secondly, we will pay attention to Aristotle's examination of the changes of the tragic hero's fortune. In order to understand this change of fortune we will explore *hamartia*, a fatal flaw which leads to the downfall of the protagonist. After this analysis, we will return to the definition of tragedy. And with the tragedy's components and ends taken into consideration, we will ultimately arrive to dispositions to tragic emotions and their significance in the clarification of Aristotle's approach to tragedy.

This part of the paper will propel us to take a look into Aristotle's understanding of emotions as a crucial element of his conception of moral virtues. That is because virtue is formed from the alignment



and the constant regulation of emotions. The reasoning behind this inquisition into the subject of virtue is the proper understanding of tragic emotions that are being evoked in us by the protagonist in action. Lastly, we will arrive to the understanding of the function of tragedy as catharsis, attained by feeling fear and pity. The particular examples from the Greek tragedies such as Aeschylus' *Agamemnon*, Sophocles' *Antigone* and *Oedipus Rex* and Euripides' *Iphigenia in Aulis* will greatly help in our investigation. As contrast, we can take a look into Euripides' atypical tragedy *Medea*.

Showing that we can speak of dispositions to tragic emotions in the aforementioned sense could also have its practical purposes. Namely, by assigning the dispositional conceptual framework to Aristotle's investigation of tragedy could help refine literary criticism. If a tragedy seems incapable of evoking fear and pity which lead to catharsis in its audience, we can safely assume that it is not fulfilling its purpose. Thus, all of this will show that the tragedy's end is the manifestation of its dispositions to evoke tragic emotions.

**Key words:** emotions, dispositions, tragedy, fear, pity, Aristotle.

*Layout and printing*  
Dosije studio, Belgrade

*Print run*

50

ISBN 978-86-6427-314-5

CIP – Каталогизација у публикацији  
Народна библиотека Србије, Београд

1(048)

7.01(048)(0.034.2)

BALKAN Analytic Forum (2024 ; Beograd)

Book of abstracts / Balkan Analytic Forum, Dispositions &  
Dispositions and Values, October 2024, Belgrade, Serbia. – Belgrade :  
University, Faculty of Philosophy, 2024 (Belgrade : Dosije studio). –  
71 str. ; 24 cm

Tiraž 50. – Napomene i bibliografske reference uz tekst. –  
Bibliografija uz pojedine radove.

ISBN 978-86-6427-314-5

а) Филозофија – Апстракти

б) Филозофија уметности – Апстракти

COBISS.SR-ID 153138441



ISBN 978-86-6427-314-5



9 788664 273145