Rationality and Democracy

Pre-requisites: One of the following courses is required: Philosophy of politics or Rational choice theory or some other course with similar content.

Course objectives: Explanation of concepts of rationality and democracy as well as an explanation of their connections relevant to the theory of politics and society.

Course description: At the beginning of the course the following concepts will be explained: the concept of having preference, preference axioms, i.e. the so-called "economic" concept of rationality. Then, we'll deal with the strategies of Arrow's proof in his "impossibility theorem" as well as various attempts at overcoming the problems associated with Arrow's proof. After that, we'll make an inquiry into the conflict between individual and collective rationality through the model of game theory known as "prisoner's dilemma." The second part of the course will be focused on defining of concepts of "aggregative" and "deliberative " democracy. We will try to give an answer to the question whether the idea of deliberative democracy (as present by some authors - Rawls, Gauthier, Miller, Gutman) represents a successful response to Arrow's skeptical conclusions.

Learning Outcomes: The course is for PhD students who are focused on practical philosophy studies and who will write their theses in the field of philosophy of politics.

Literature/Reading:

• Michael Resnik, Choices. University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1987.
• Dubravka Pavličić, Teorija odlučivanja. Ekonomski fakultet u Beogradu, 2004.
• Kenneth Arrow, Social Choice and Individual Values, drugo izdanje, New York, 1963.
• Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation, Basic Books, New York, 1984.
• Robert Dal, Demokratija i njeni kriticari, CID, Podgorica 1999
• Rols Džon, Politički liberalizam.
• Milorad Stupar, “Racionalnost i demokratija”, tekst u separatu „Racionalnost i demokratija“ u časopisu Treći program za oktobar 2008.
• James Bohman and William Rehg, Deliberative Democracy:Essays on Reason and Politics,MIT Press, 1997