Belgrade Philosophical Annual – Issue 32, Year 2019
Institute for Philosophy, University of Belgrade
ISSN: 0353-3891
Voin Milevski (University of Belgrade)
Alex Miller (University of Otago)
Christian B. Miller (Wake Forest University)
Caj Strandberg (University of Oslo)
Maja Kutlača (University of Osnabrück)
John Eriksson (University of Gothenburg)
August 1, 2019
The central aim of this special issue is to present some of the latest advances in the field of moral psychology. We encourage empirically informed takes on the subject. Specifically, the issue will focus on some of the most perplexing questions concerning the nature of moral motivation, reasoning, and thought. What is the nature of the connection between our sincere moral judgements and our motivation to act? How is our intention to act related to our motivation? What are the main characteristics of moral reasoning and character? Other problems of interest include the role of reason and sentiment in moral motivation, altruism versus egoism, and the psychological and evolutionary development of moral capacities.
Submission of original papers is invited on (but is not limited to) the following topics:
All inquires and submissions should be directed to the editor of the special issue at vmilevsk@f.bg.ac.rs or to the journal editor (S. Perović) at sperovic@f.bg.ac.rs.
Belgrade Philosophical Annual – Issue 32, Year 2019
Institute for Philosophy, University of Belgrade
ISSN: 0353-3891
Živan Lazović (University of Belgrade)
Annalisa Coliva (University of California, Irvine)
Michael Blome-Tillmann (McGill University)
September 1, 2019
The main aim of this special issue is to illuminate a variety of topics central to contemporary discussions of skepticism, a philosophical view that calls into question the very possibility of knowledge about the external world. Skeptical reasoning comes in many different forms, but the most powerful of those proceeds by means of the skeptical hypothesis that produces an unsettling outcome: we cannot know anything about the external world since we cannot successfully rule out that we are being deceived by an evil genius (or in another analogous way). The issue will consider the following variety of responses to this form of skepticism which have been prominent in epistemology over the last few decades: contextualism, neo-Moorean responses, semantic externalism, Wittgensteinian approach and relativism. Other related issues include infallibilism, fallibilism, deductive closure, relevant alternatives, modal conditions on knowledge, the role of presuppositions in knowledge, etc. We also encourage papers on the possibility of the world being a full-scale simulation as a recent prominent form of the skeptical challenge.
All inquires and submissions should be directed to the editor of the special issue at zlazovic@f.bg.ac.rs or to the journal editor (S. Perović) at sperovic@f.bg.ac.rs.
Submitted papers should be prepared for blind review. All other relevant information should be sent in a separate document containing author’s name and affiliation, the title of the paper, short abstract of not more than 250 words, and 4-5 keywords. All documents should be in a *.doc, *.docx, or *.pdf format.
Belgrade Philosophical Annual is an open access academic journal published by the Institute for Philosophy, University of Belgrade, committed to the double blind peer reviewing process. Previous issues of the journal, including previous special issues with downloadable papers and other relevant information, can be accessed at www.f.bg.ac.rs/bpa.